Rynar wrote:
Well, sure, if you're willing to ignore the industrial changes that take place when converting to a domestic industrial production economy to a war economy, and refuse to take into accont the massive Keynesianism "boom" that created, sure. But then you'd have to admit to not understanding the underlying theory, so I'll just go ahead and hold my breath.
I don't need to admit to anything. Economic theory has nothing to do with it. I'm not even contesting with your basic assertion of Roosevelt's economic philosophy, just the degree to which you think it would drive his actions.
No amount of "boom" and no shift in the economy could possibly have made us able to produce any additional battleships any faster. There's only so much steel available, and while you could build new mills and mine more iron, that takes
time. You need to have the harbor slips to build those battleships and carriers.. and there are only so many harbors available with building slips. You can make more slips, but only in certain places and there are only so many places, and those places need to have a decent-sized city nearby due to the ancillary needs of a shipyard.. and those slips also need to produce large numbers of escort ships, submarines, transports, and other ships in addition to your capital ships, and repair damaged ships to boot.
As it was, we couldn't even finish 2 battleships by the end of the war,
Illinois and
Kentucky as well as not completing 4 of the 6 planned Alaska class battle cruisers, so I don't know how in the hell you can possibly think there was any more capacity to build more battleships to replace those lost at Pearl Harbor, especially when 6 of them were repaired and returned to action anyhow. It's not as if we could have built any more if we didn't repair those, or we somehow would have completed any fewer if we'd avoided a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor; we maxxed out our capacity starting 10 new ones from 1937 to 1939 and we had 2 that we simply couldn't get done.
You're focusing on economic theory at the expense of what was physically possible. Let's look at total production of war materiel:
22 large aircraft carriers
119 other aircraft carriers
10 battleships (Including 2
North Carolinas technically comissioned in 1941, several months before hostilities, but in anticipation of them)
48 cruisers of all types (including 2 battle cruisers)
349 destroyers
420 convoy escorts of various types
203 submarines
33.9 million tons of variosu merchant shipping
This doesn't include enormous numbers of small amphibious assault craft, nor those ships not actually completed during the war such as the aforementioned
Illinois and
Kentucky. I don't know how you think that having 8 additional elderly battleships, 1 additional ex-battleship used for gunnery practice (
Utah) and 2 additional destroyers as well as a number of P-40 fighters would really have meaningfully decreased this construction and the attendant "boom".
In addition to that we produced:
23,119 light tanks
8,068 other light armored fighting vehicles
68,864 medium tanks
2,202 heavy tanks
3,740 very heavy bombers (presumably the B-29; unclear what this classification means but it was in a category all its own)
31,685 heavy bombers
21,461 medium bombers
39,986 light bombers
99,465 fighters
4,106 recon aircraft
95,516 support aircraft of various types
Considered in addition to naval production, it is impossible to see how not getting sneak-attacked at Pearl Harbor would really have decreased this in a meaningful fashion. Not only that, but had the damage at Pearl Harbor been significantly
worse (there were valuable targets untouched such as fuel depots and the submarine pens, and of course the valuable carriers could have been present) I don't see how you think production could ahve been meaningfully higher.
What you're missing is that even if replacing damaged ships from a sneak attack would have fit into FDRs economic views (and I don't disagree), it wasn't phyiscally possible to build anymore battleships than were already on order anyhow,. More importantly, the scale of war production was already so high that having the battle fleet available would hardly have decreased any Keynesian "boom" from war production - especially when you consider that some of those battleships would have been lost in any confrontation with the Japanese fleet, since those WWI relics were hardly suited to confront
Yamato and
Musashi without suffering serious damage at best.
Try to not view everything in terms of it fitting into economic ideology. It makes you sound like a fanatic. Regardless of what economic theory you adhere to, when you start a war, if you can have 8 battleships or 0 battleships, any fool can see it's better toha8.