Elmarnieh wrote:
Republicans were the party of not getting into wars back then because it was bad for liberty at home and it cost money.
"Not getting into wars" has nothing to do with "weak on defense". The best way to not get into a war is to be stronger than any potential adversary. It's also a little bit irrelevant in the thinking of the late 50s/early 60s which assumed conventional war was essentially obsolete, and global thermonuclear war was the main threat. When an adversary can begin initiating multimegaton devices over your cities (even if its only a few of them) on a few hours' notice the concept of "not getting into wars" becomes pretty meaningless, as does concern over "liberties" or "cost". There was no arriving at an understanding with the Soviets at that time; even if we were light on defense spending they would still perceive us as a threat because the failures of Communism were still not all that apparent yet, and they'd been subject to two major invasions in the previous 50 years. Their view of themselves as exceedingly vulnerable was due to their experience, lack of technological progress, and world situation, and really had little to do with our actions.
Of course, JFK had to rely on a nonexistant "missile gap" but to be fair, it wasn't only him as no one realized how far behind the Soviets were on ballistic missiles despite their Sputnik success; even the most conservative estimates of their ICBM arsenal were well above the 4 working prototype R-7 missiles they had (SS-6; look it up, this missile was hilariously oversized and inefficient not to mention vulnerable to early destruction). Given the rate at which they actually
did catch up, especially when the R-36 appeared in 1967 with 10+ warheads and a much higher throw weight than the Minuteman III, which carries only 3 warheads maximum.
Kennedy was right that Eisenhower was weak on defence, not because a gap existed (it did, but it was the other way around) but because one would rapidly develop in the next 5-10 years as the Soviets hurried to improve their inadequate delivery systems, and were further spurred on by the fact that they failed to establish an IRBM deterrent in Cuba. We compounded this by horrendous decisions regarding our own straegic arsenal which are reflected now in the fact that we're still flying bombers old enough that the crews' grandfathers may have flown them; strategic errors that continued well into the Carter and early Reagan administration. That era was marked by incredible strategic blunders on our part even disregarding involvement in Viet Nam. A better strategy 50 years ago would mean we probably wouldn't have had a 9/11 and two wars, and we'd have a cheaper, but equally or more powerful military that was more focused on operational offense in support of a strategically defensive posture rahter than running all over the world chasing down terrorists one or two at a time.