Aethien wrote:
Lemme try this once more, then I'm out:
Talya said:
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To defeat them, it must be done by demoralization. This requires the political will to be utterly ruthless and intentionally attack their civilian support structure.
Not collateral damage, not defeating them militarily. Purposely killing civilians. Maybe I'm just not understanding what a "civilian support structure" is, but, yes, I have a moral problem with that.
It's a term Taly is basically making up herself (i.e. it's not a professional term that I'm aware of), but it's not a bad one (it avoids prejudicial language or euphemism) - but a civilian support structure is a combination of the civilians themselves and the material support they provide to the actual fighters. Just like a regular military can't fight without an industrial and economic base, an insurgency can't fight without civilian support to provide food, places to sleep and hide, etc. ISIS is in this transitional state where it is fighting as a regular military but without the industrial/economic base of a regular military. It is able to get away with this because it has excellent motivation and a strong network to utilize captured and salvaged assets, while its opponents are a mix of unmotivated and incompetent. Air attacks alone are rarely terribly successful; the Kosovo war is the sole exception.
As for the moral problem, it's understandable that you have one but the enemy does not give a ****. Morality is for
after the fight. Morality is for not going out of your way to inflict pain, suffering and death
unrelated to the fight. Trying to sanitize war with moral considerations in the actual combat just drags it out and encourages those who truly don't care to exploit the moral concerns of their opponents.
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And, British strategic bombing was specifically aimed at destroying the enemy's morale and will to fight. NOT ability, will.
These are not exclusive to each other. When your opponent destroys your means of effectively combatting him, what effect do you think that has on your will to fight?
Furthermore, the British bombing campaign is not distinct from the overall Allied campaign which rapidly shifted to focusing on different critical areas of the industrial chain, which were attacked with varying degrees of success - ball ebarings were at one point the target, oil was a target, and so forth.
Finally, just as in WWII, there is no reason this has to be done exclusively from the air. Germany was eventually crushed between the Allied and Soviet invasions. The goal is not to demoralize and destroy the will of the population to fight from the air just for the sake of doing it from the air, or to do that to the exclusion of attacking materiel targets; it's to destroy the enemy's will and ability to fight
by whatever means is practicableQuote:
Again with the Wikipedia, because it's well-sourced:
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The purpose of the area bombardment of cities was laid out in a British Air Staff paper, dated 23 September 1941:
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The ultimate aim of an attack on a town area is to break the morale of the population which occupies it. To ensure this, we must achieve two things: first, we must make the town physically uninhabitable and, secondly, we must make the people conscious of constant personal danger. The immediate aim, is therefore, twofold, namely, to produce (i) destruction and (ii) fear of death.
I am amazed that I need to point out that 1941 was not only not the end of the air campaign, the U.S. wasn't even involved yet and that campaign evolved over the following 3 and a half years. Furthermore:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_IIStrategic bombing has been criticized on practical grounds because it does not work predictably. The radical changes it forces on a targeted population can backfire, including the counterproductive result of freeing inessential labourers to fill worker shortages in war industries.[22]
Much of the doubt about the effectiveness of the bomber war comes from the fact German industrial production increased throughout the war.[23] A combination of factors helped increase German war material output, these included; continuing development from production lines started before the war, limiting competing models of equipment, government enforced sharing of production techniques, a change in how contracts were priced and an aggressive worker suggestion program. At the same time production plants had to deal with a loss of experienced workers to the military, assimilating untrained workers, culling workers incapable of being trained, and utilizing unwilling forced labor. Strategic bombing failed to reduce German war production. There is insufficient information to ascertain how much additional potential industrial growth the bombing campaign may have curtailed.[24]
However, attacks on the infrastructure were taking place. The attacks on Germany's canals and railroads made transportation of materiel difficult.[21]
The attack on oil production, oil refineries, and tank farms was, however, extremely successful and made a very large contribution to the general collapse of Germany in 1945. In the event, the bombing of oil facilities became Albert Speer's main concern; however, this occurred sufficiently late in the war that Germany would soon be defeated in any case.German insiders credit the Allied bombing offensive with crippling the German war industry. Speer repeatedly said (both during and after the war) it caused crucial production problems. Admiral Karl Dönitz, head of the U-boat fleet (U-waffe), noted in his memoirs failure to get the revolutionary Type XXI U-boats (which could have completely altered the balance of power in the Battle of the Atlantic) into service was entirely the result of the bombing. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Europe), says, despite bombing becoming a major effort, between December 1942 and June 1943, "The attack on the construction yards and slipways was not heavy enough to be more than troublesome" and the delays in delivery of Type XXIs and XXIIIs up until November 1944 "cannot be attributed to the air attack",[21] but adds, "The attacks during the late winter and early spring of 1945 did close, or all but close, five of the major yards, including the great Blohm and Voss plant at Hamburg".[21]
Bottom line - while attacking some sorts of targets was unproductive or of unclear utility, attacks on oil, rail, and submarine assets were highly effective. This is attested to by the Nazis themselves. Obviously, there is complex cause at work here and different estimates of how much of the effect was from the bombing and how much from other sources but again - the goal is not to destroy ISIS with air attacks to validate air bombardment as a strategy; it's to get rid of ISIS and there is nothing wrong with combining air attacks with other means.
As for the effects on morale:
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Although designed to "break the enemy's will", the opposite often happened. The British did not crumble under the German Blitz and other air raids early in the war. British workers continued to work throughout the war and food and other basic supplies were available throughout.
The impact of bombing on German morale was significant according to Professor John Buckley. Around a third of the urban population under threat of bombing had no protection at all. Some of the major cities saw 55–60 percent of dwellings destroyed. Mass evacuations were a partial answer for six million civilians, but this had a severe impact on morale as German families were split up to live in difficult conditions. By 1944 absenteeism rates of 20–25 percent were not unusual and in post-war analysis 91 percent of civilians stated bombing was the most difficult hardship to endure and was the key factor in the collapse of their own morale.[165] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that the bombing was not stiffening morale but seriously depressing it; fatalism, apathy, defeatism were apparent in bombed areas. The Luftwaffe was blamed for not warding off the attacks and confidence in the Nazi regime fell by 14 percent. Some 75 percent of Germans believed the war was lost in the spring of 1944, owing to the intensity of the bombing.[166]
Buckley argues the German war economy did indeed expand significantly following Albert Speer's appointment as Reichsminister of Armaments, "but it is spurious to argue that because production increased then bombing had no real impact". The bombing offensive did do serious damage to German production levels. German tank and aircraft production, though reached new records in production levels in 1944, was in particular one-third lower than planned.[25] In fact, German aircraft production for 1945 was planned at 80,000, showing Erhard Milch and other leading German planners were pushing for even higher outputs; "unhindered by Allied bombing German production would have risen far higher".[26]
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What Taly is doing when she talks about destroying their morale is basically skipping over the intermediate step of what target are you going to attack to destroy that? Morale can be damaged, but not directly; you obviously cannot drop a bomb on "morale". you have to attack something that will negatively effect morale. Taly is not acquainted with the niceties of targeting and such, and shouldn't be expected to be - that's for people that get paid to do that to do. That does not mean she's advocating a return to 1930s era targeting techniques.
The 1930s strategy, of just dropping bombs all over the place in cities and thinking sheer horror was what the British were attempting in the 1941 memo you referenced. It was not that destroying and enemy's will to fight couldn't work, but that the British, in 1941, were doing it wrong. You don't target that will by simply killing the enemy, you do it by
removing the enemy's ability to reply. When the British were being bombed by Germany, they could see the effects of their own defense with every German fighter shot down and this meant the terrorization effects were reduced, eliminated, or even reversed - it stiffened their will to fight because they could see they were forcing the enemy to bleed too.
In the allied bombing campaigns the Germans could, of course, see the same thing but they were also being pressed with ground combat in several theaters at any given time, and they could easily see that no matter how many Allied bombers they shot down there were always more and the defenses were being pushed back more and more as the Luftwaffe lost the ability to fly and the number of bombers did not decrease.
The same thing occurred in the Gulf War - The Iraqi Army was not actually destroyed until it was engaged on the ground, but the majority of it had already lost the will to fight because not only were they having the **** bombed out of them, they could see clearly that they were defenseless - their air defense systems were ruthlessly destroyed by SEAD attacks and their air force was obviously neutralized - an Iraqi soldier could easily see that there were no Iraqi fighters doing anything to protect him. On top of that they weren't receiving any supplies.
You target someone's will to fight by targeting their ability to do so. Of course, you have to give them an out as well - once they give up (really give up; not the Palestinian "give up" of starting to fight again 3 hours after the ceasefire) you stop killing them. If you just keep right on killing them you may as well try to exterminate them because with no way out they'll fight like a cornered animal. EVEN ISIS has to be given an out, but that out is basically "surrender and never attempt anything like this ever again" but in order to get there the force used against them can't just be enough to "get them to quit for the moment" but such that they see that resistance is in fact futile.
We don't want to do that because of our moral qualms about it - but those moral qualms are inevitably weaponized by those that don't share them.