The Glade 4.0

I like this. Do you know the approximate cost for active versus reserve units? What's the training/effectiveness gap between them? Why 65%? Is that a toss-out or is there a basis for this?



I tend to lean this way, but there are some seriously unstable countries out there. Not sure if I can swallow this one.



Seems like reasonable goals, and of course, the level and types of systems would not be stagnant, but would depend on current threats at any time.



I question the practicality of this.



Wouldn't it be more likely that we would have 100% failure in regions and 0% failure in others? (depending on where the detonations occur) Does an average of 70% matter much?

The training-effectiveness gap is a matter of huge contention. I would contend that right now, most reserve/NG units are closer to the effectiveness of active duty units than at most points in history due to heavy deployments giving people experience, but that depends heavily on the unit, where it is in its deployment cycle, and other factors. Active duty people might have a different opinion and I would say that anything you might read on the subject you should watch carefully for an agenda. There's a lot of emotional investment in that topic.

The basis for the 65% is on an average of one Brigade Combat Team per state for the national guard (note that's an average; different states can support different sizes) which is, as I understand it the current endstate for the NG. The other 50 Brigade Combat Teams would be 15 Reserve and 35 active; of which 6 would be independant brigades/cavalry regiments and 29 would be divisional. I have this entire force structure worked out in my head but not all down on paper yet. Suffice to say this only addresses maneuver units, but I would change the structure of the NG units for increased ABM/air defense capability in the form of PAC-2/3, THAAD, or SM-3 so that each state would ahve at a bare minimum one battery defending it. A lot of ancillary capability desinged to sustain a WWII years-long conflict or counterinsurgency would be scrapped to cover the cost.

The basic goal with the active Army would be to be able to put 3 heavy divisions (9 Brigades) in any given theater with 3 weeks notice and 3 more each following 3 weeks. Obviously not all the active Brigades would be heavy, so the Reserves would come next, then the NG. The idea is that in the time it takes to get to the National Guard, the conflict is essentially over.



I don't really see that many unstable countries will be able to get nukes. Those that have or may have (Iran, Pakistan) really just have unstable areas. Even if they do I don't see them being able to catch up in delivery capability and numbers. Ok so chilimacistan can fling 4 ICBMs with 1 warhead at us. That's why we want at least a battery of ABM in each state, plus the extra larger states will have and national-level defenses. We can probably deal with that, and even if one gets through we can survive as a nation. It will go bad for chilimacistan though. There's a difference between unstble and completely suicidal or irrational.



Exactly.



In what regard? Politically? Yes, politically it is unlikely to be so clear-cut even if we move in this direction. Them's the breaks I'm afraid.



That's a real possibility, but then the intact regions can help the seriously damaged ones recover. Like I said, it's a very hasty spot-on-the-map estimate. Don't read much into it. I picked it only because its easy to understand the cascading failure effects of losing the electrical grid.

Depending on the nature of the attack damage could be distributed fairly evenly, or it might be highly concentrated.

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