She didn't do anything to for which to be arrested. It's not illegal to be an ***. She is within her rights absolutely, but if she is telling the truth she probably would have been along quicker with compliance. There is also the issue of being courteous to her fellow motorists, who have rights too

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,[a] against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

As of March 2013, and a 5-4 decision written by Antonin Scalia about the Jardines search, seizure, and arrests in Florida, drug dogs cannot be used to create reasonable suspicion or probably cause; nor, for that matter, can they be brought onto or in contact with personal property without a warrant, especially not someone's home. Scalia also specifically indicated that what a drug dog sniffs is not part of Plain Sight Doctrine, either. A later decision, concerning one of Georgia's new carry statutes, created another Federal precedent that extended castle domain to your vehicle.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court disagreed, despite three previous cases in which the Court had held that a dog sniff was not a search when deployed against luggage at an airport, against vehicles in a drug interdiction checkpoint, and against vehicles during routine traffic stops. The Court made clear by this ruling that it considers the deployment of a police dog at the front door of a private residence to be another matter altogether.

Likewise, searches are covered by the Fourth Amendment ...



And last I checked, my vehicle is one of my effects. Reasonable suspicion is just legal balderdash for, "We don't think the Constitution applies here."

Diamondeye:

You should probably just read the decision. Your third-party analysis is confusing the dissent with Scalia's position.

Diamondeye:

You linked a third-party source with a blatantly inaccurate representation of the majority of opinion -- a representation you quoted. Had you read the decision, you'd know that your third-party source made a mistake.

It is not the dog that is the problem, but the behavior that here involved use of the dog. We think a typical person would find it “‘a cause for great alarm’” (the kind of reaction the dissent quite rightly relies upon to justify its no-night-visits rule, post, at 5) to find a stranger snooping about his front porch with or without a dog.

The government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is therefore affirmed.

*1414 We granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the officers' behavior was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 995, 181 L.Ed.2d 726 (2012).

The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." The Amendment establishes a simple baseline, one that for much of our history formed the exclusive basis for its protections: When "the Government obtains information by physically intruding" on persons, houses, papers, or effects, "a `search' within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment" has "undoubtedly occurred." United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, ___, n. 3, 132 S.Ct. 945, 950-951, n. 3, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). By reason of our decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), property rights "are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations," Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) — but though Katz may add to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the Amendment's protections "when the Government does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area," United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

Just last Term, we considered an argument much like this. Jones held that tracking an automobile's whereabouts using a physically-mounted GPS receiver is a Fourth Amendment search. The Government argued that the Katz standard "show[ed] that no search occurred," as the defendant had "no `reasonable expectation of privacy'" in his whereabouts on the public roads, Jones, 565 U.S., at ___, 132 S.Ct., at 950 — a proposition with at least as much support in our case law as the one the State marshals here. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983). But because the GPS receiver had been physically mounted on the defendant's automobile (thus intruding on his "effects"), we held that tracking the vehicle's movements was a search: a person's "Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation." Jones, supra, at ___, 132 S.Ct., at 950. The Katz reasonable expectations test "has been added to, not substituted for," the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment, and so is unnecessary to consider when the government gains evidence by physically intruding on constitutionally protected areas. Jones, supra, at ___, 132 S.Ct., at 951-952.

Arathain:

Scalia's opinion and Kagan's concurrence both argue that drug-sniffing dogs are specialized tools not commonly owned by members of the general public. That contention means drug-sniffing dogs fail the Katz-test on their face: they can detect things a human being cannot detect unaided. Jardines and Jones, were the precedents and rulings applied appropriately, invalidated the usual causal chain for vehicle searches and drug busts. That said, look at the quote about Katz in the previous post and Jones decision.

You don't need a drug dog to detect the use of most narcotics by a driver; you especially don't need a drug dog to detect pot being used while driving. Drug dogs, however, are specialized detection tools that obliterate any "reasonable expectation of privacy." Their use is already intruding, and Jones held that the car is an effect -- thus a constitutionally protected property area per the Fourth Amendment.

It should be the fact that drug dogs fail at rates greater than guessing that should bar their use as a end run around warrants.

Drug dogs do not come in contact with the vehicle, and remain in public space.

No, I see that a GPS receiver planted on a vehicle is a violation, specifically because it is mounted on a vehicle. Drug dogs do not come in contact with the vehicle, and remain in public space.

I'm not seeing anything that supports your interpretation.

Diamondeye:

You've claimed to have read the case, but require someone else to provide a link?

Very well ...

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case? ... i=scholarr

There's you link to the decision in full.

First, you should note that the question at hand was whether or not the officers conducted a search. That was, amusingly, the sole question before the Supreme Court of the United States:


You should read all of section III in toto, because Scalia limits the Katz decision, limits the effects of decisions affecting other things, including your vehicle. Katz, per the Jardines decision, can only make it more difficult for the government to get a warrant, not less.

The following paragraph from Section III, however, is money ...

The key phrase is in parentheses -- "thus intruding on his 'effects'." The car is an effect. U.S. v. Jones decision actually does more harm to canine searches than anything else, because actually application would prevent them from bringing the dog close enough without implicit or explicit permission.

Scalia used the Jones precedent in Florida v. Jardines.

Yes, the handlers can and do cause the dog to alert falsely.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3078300/

http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/crime ... olice-dogs