Elmarnieh wrote:
The point is that the fear of terrorism has caused response far far beyond its risk.
its like I have a project and risk Y has a .001% chance to occur risk X has a 50% chance to occur and I spend all my time managing the risk of risk Y.
This doesn't establish that at all.
Disregaring the huge potential additional harm that terrorism can cause in terms of property damage, most of these things aren't related to each other in terms of how we deal with them. Terrorism is dealt with by completely different things from drowning which in turn is dealt with by completely different things from heart disease. You can deal with heart disease effectively with a combination of research, treatment, and by getting people to do a lot of the dealing with it themselves through a healthy lifestyle. Heart disease, drowning, falling, and
We invest more effort in terrorism mainly because it is a way by which people get killed and proeprty damaged or destroyed
caused by other people. Failing to del with it encourages more of it (not to mention the fact that all the deaths prevented clearly don't get counted into how likely you are to get killed by a terrorist). Because terrorism is done by people, it necessarily requires more effort to do anything about it
at all. Diseases and accidents don't look at what you are doing and actively try to circumvent them; humans do.
Your example of X and Y is inapplicable as well because you are just one person. Obviously you have limited time. We don't handle herart disease and terrorism by having a doctor split his time between working on heart research and scanning bags at the airport. We have different people do that.
If you were managing a project, you would hire a chief of security and delegate him responsibility and authority for the security of the project so that you could manage the acutal work. However, if you tried to calculate the risk of someone breaking in and damaging your work versus the risk of it failing due to improperly doing the work in the first place and then decide that $100 was all you needed to spend on security, you'd get no security because you couldn't even afford the chief. In the end, you'd greatly increase the likelyhood of someone breaking in because part of the point of the security is to deter the
attempt. All this because you're attempting to gloss over differences in the nature of the threats to your work by oversimplifying them down to likelyhood.
That's the other hidden message here. There is no particular reason to single out terrorism this way except to ***** about methods of preventing or combating it. Why isn't this study ***** about our wild overemphasis on falling? Fear of heights/falling is
incredibly common; people fear it vastly more than terrorism. We expend
huge resources on safety to prevent it; how many millions of railings do you think are present in this country? And yet falling pales in comparison to heart disease in terms of causing death.
Silly, eh? So is this "study" (which, the article first suspiciously says is done by the NSC and then later claims it produced its own ratios based on NSC data) because its basic premise is that there's some reason we should be focusing both on numerical likelyhoods at the expense of all else, and that we should do so with an eye to terrorism exclusively.