I've gone over where I think military spending should be cut before, more than once. However, since some people think it's easier to just think "DE wanks off to expensive military toys" rather than actually pay attention to my position, I'll explain again - at length.
In order to understand what I'm talking about, there are 4 major strategic errors since WWII that have continuing aftereffects I would like to remedy. I beleive these errors have cost both lives and money and left us with a military more expensive relative to its capability than it strictly needs to be.
1) Involvement in Viet Nam. The reasons this was a strategic error I really should not have to relate. It had tremendous lasting effects, because, much like Iraq, it diverted focus from defense of the nation and its strategic interests to trying to sustain a democracy in a nation where that simply wasn't going to happen, and where it really got us pretty much nothing to do so. In Afghanistan there was a strong case to be made for going in and punching out the Taliban and getting out, a weaker case in Iraq, and in the case of Viet Nam.. all I can say is the reasoning was a product of the times.
2) Horrendous strategic decisions regarding ABM systems and nuclear deterrence in general. Much of this can be laid at the feet of Robert McNamara, quite possibly the worst Secretary of Defense in our history. Donald Rumsfeld approaches him in sheer imbicility, and I think it's no coincidence that both attempted to run the DOD as if it were a business and ended up making terrible decisions because the things that make you a profit in business do not make you a winner at strategic gamesmanship or at restoring democracy to shitholes.
3) Neglect of the military under both the Carter and Clinton administrations that approaches dereliction of duty, followed by spending decisions under the Bush administration that attempted to remedy the problem while at the same time exacerbating it by repeating the Viet Nam mistake of focusing on a couple of shitholes at the expense of larger national interest.
4) Excessive concern with making the military do things that are really not the province of the military in order to be politically acceptable to others. A certain level of this capability is needed, but the aggregate effect has been to have large facets of the military that do not contribute to combat power.
Now, where would DE go?
Well, there are two ways to answer this. Where would I go now, and where would I go if we weren't already in a **** sandwich of expense both military and otherwise? Either way, DE has a few goals
1) Extricate the nation from current, lengthy conflicts. Regardless of what our goals and reasons for going into Afghanistan and Iraq were, they should have been accomplished by now, and if they were going to take this long, we should have had better goals
2) Pursue a policy of deterrence, both conventional and nuclear. We should maintain forces of both types such that a potential adversary would think it unwise or of little benefit to challenge us.
3) Foriegn involvement should be a policy of massive retaliation for attack, and short, sharp involvement with potential threats to our foriegn economic interests or our non-CONUS states or posessions. Essentially, if they aren't a threat, we don't need to be there, and if they are a threat, they won't be there.
All of the above is predicated on the political will to make it clear that we are not concerned with the sensibilities of other nations.
As such, here is how I would re-align our military:
1) Recall of most foriegn land-based forces, not because of some naive "why do we need to be there?" question like a teenager asking mom why he can't borrow the car, but because the time has passed where these are of benefit to us. Forces in Okinawa, Korea, Europe, and of course deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan would be removed to the U.S.
2) Re-negotiate any defensive treaties we are in such that allies such as Japan, South Korea, and NATO nations can expect U.S. aid if directly attacked, but are obligated to provide for their own defense without U.S. forces being permanently stationed there.
3) End the nuclear-sharing agreement with some NATO nations. No nuclear weapons will be stored outside U.S. territory other than aboard ships of war or their embarked aircraft.
4) eliminate all ICBMs over the next 20 years. Sell off land ICBMs are presently leased on and as much other associated equipment as possible.
5) Withdrawl from all arms control treaties of any kind. This would be done in conjunction with a unilateral promise to Russia that we will voluntarily allow inspection of what nuclear arms we are using as a sign of good faith.
6) Retirement of the W-76 and W-78 warheads. If compatible, the W-87 would replace the W-76 aboard SLBMs; if not it would also be retired and a new warhead developed, or the W-88 production would be re-opened. These older warheads are of questionable reliability and safety. Eliminate other unused stockpiles of nuclear warheads and close some storage facilities. Basically, no more than 10% of the total arsenal should be sitting around unmated to a delivery system.
7) Retirement of all B-52 aircraft. The B-1B would be converted to the B-1R standard and a new, mach 2 strategic bomber would be procured on the order of 120 aircraft in order to retire the B-1 and B-2 fleets as theit airframes reached the end of their service life.
8) A new SRAM-III program to replace the cancelled SRAM-II of the early 90s. To be armed with existing W-80 or W-84 warheads.
9) Eliminate roughly 25% of the Army Reserve entirely
10) Convert the National Guard to a 1-Brigade-per-state model (on average, obviously different states can support different sizes) with a reduction in tank units, but with each state having, at minimum, 1 battery of PAC-3, THAAD, or land-based SM-3 ABM run by its national guard and intended to protect that state against ballistic missile attack. Cut overall National Guard end strength by 10% by focusing on units not part of combat brigades.
11) Cut the active army from 44 brigades to 38, and eliminate field headquarters above Corps level; retain only 2 Army level HQs: First Army, Third Army. Eliminate HQs like the Joint Forces Command the Gates was already trying to kill that serve no real purpose other than to provide jobs for officers. Cut overall officer strength by 10% exclusive of other cuts.
12) Move non-combat-oriented Engineer projects out from under the DOD; the domestic Army Corps of Engineers would become a civilian agency under the Department of the Interior and as much of its work as possible would be handed over to the states along with the property and employees. Cut an equivalent number of soldiers from the Army.
13) Sale of most Strykers to whatever foreign customers can be found and restoration of most of these units to either heavy or light configuration from existing vehicle stores. No more that 3 stryker brigades.
14) Sale of any remaining "war stocks" of construction equipment and other vehicles not already on an unit MTOE, or disposal as scrap
15) End the Littoral Combat Ship program; sale to foreign customers, or transfer to the Coast Guard
16) Retire all remaining Perry-class frigates; offer for foreign sale on favorable terms including an option to purchase upgraded electronics and combat systems, such as an 12-cell (or more if it will fit) VLS to replace the removed SAM launcher; this would allow a capacity of 32x ESSM and 4 x Harpoon.
17) Retire all remaining EA-6B Growler aircraft; do not accelerate deployment of the EA-18G replacement.
18) Foreign sale of the 3 remaining decomissioned non-VLS AEGIS cruisers, if in a condition to permit this.
19) Resinstatement of the requirement that all future cruisers and carriers be nuclear-powered. Extend this requirement to any destroyers after the Arleigh Burke and Zumwalt classes. End the Zumwalt class at 3, as planned, and the Burke class at DDG-115. Begin development of a new destroyer class, nuclear powered, with a design goal displacement not to exceed 10,000 tons. Any future amphibious ships that will operate fixed-wing aircraft should also be nuclear-powered.
20) Restarting of the CG(X) cruiser program, but with a smaller design goal; on the order of 17,000 tons rather than the original 27,000, and with 256-384 VLS cells rather than 512. A goal of 17 ships should be met. In addition, a larger class comparable to the original CG(X) should be built and designated a "Battleship" starting at hull number BB-73. This ship should still not have the previously desired 512 VLS cells; rather it should have a number in the range of 384 like its smaller counterpart, but should be designed with room for at several future railgun and laser systems. Existing gun systems can be employed until they are ready, but this class of ship should not begin construction for at least 10 years anyhow. Note that the term "Battleship" here reflects the displacement of the ship and its role as the center of a task force; it is not intended to be some sort of WWII-style battlewagon. It could easily be called a "Battlecruiser" as well.
21) Along with 20, accelerate retirement of the oldest Nimitz-class carriers after USS Enterprise is retired; set a goal of 9 active carriers groups, but with full-size air groups rather than the cut-down air wings they currently employ. See below regarding Marine aviation assets.
22) Retire and sell or dispose of the 11 remaining non-VLS Los Angeles class attack submarines. Keep the option open for additional Virginias to replace them, down the road, but do not accelerate planned procurement of Virginias
23) As converison to nuclear power permits, retire oilers.
24) Continue to produce and fund PAC-3, THAAD, SM-3, and GBI ABM systems.
25) De-activate the headquarters and division-level support elements for the III MEF/3rd Marine Division. Move its 2 infantry regiments to the other 2 MEFs administratively. Deactivate it's artillery regiment (12th Marines). De-activate Combat Logistics Regiments 3, 35, and 37; if necessary move some of their subordinate elements to the 1st and 2nd Marine Division logistics elements to support the additional regiment; de-activate the remaining subordinate elements.
26) De-activate the 3rd Marine Air Wing; use the existing planes and pilots to help increase the strength of the airwings aboard the carriers.
27) Complete review of procurement and spending rules
28) Complete review of DOD activities that are not easily identifiable big-ticket items. There are thousands of money-wasting little activities going on. Each and every one of these should be closely scrutinized to see if its value to the support of actual combat is justified compared to its cost, and if not eliminated. Everything from the cranky retired Sergeants Major at Range Control to the old ladies that quit half an hour early at the chow hall to..well, and so on. I'm not even going to try to summarize this bullshit here; I could only scratch the surface.
Basically, we need to cut stuff that is about us going around trying to police everything, and retain stuff that is about us bringing the hammer down on anyone that either attacks us, or **** with our strategic interests in materials, energy, and commerce. We do not, for example, need to retain 4100-ton frigates (larger than most WWII destroyers) that have been stripped of their main offensive system because of its obsolescence in order to chase **** pirates around; we can do that with destroyers that are also useful for a hell of a lot of other things. We do not need to retain 70 year old bombers or ICBMs from the 1960s; we need to look forward to new ideas that are more reliable, more versatile, less vulnerable, and which do not involve us keeping 3 types of heavy bomber in service because we didn't buy enough of 1, we squandered the usefulness of 1 with an idiotic treaty, and the other one is soldiering on because we **** the other 2 up so badly. We do not need endless headquarters full of officers that sit around and do nothing but make powerpoint slides and brief generals who themselves do not actually command anything besides their staff.
The goal is not to cut the defense budget in and of itself; some cuts are necessary because of the financial situation we are in but those can mostly be made by eliminating war spending. Other cuts need to come from practically everywhere else; Congress needs to feel the pain politically of having to cut popular programs and the public needs to feel the pain of having to live life without a government program for every damn thing. The goal is to get actual defense for our money; our defense establishment should be such that, ideally, we never have to employ it because anyone seriously contemplating **** with us is afraid of the hammer that will hit them. We should not be focusing on more ways to go around playing whackamole with shithole dictators and terrorists; we should be focusing on ways to make it not worth it to attack us in the first place. After 9-11 Kabul should have been a **** crater, not a garrison.
_________________ "Hysterical children shrieking about right-wing anything need to go sit in the corner and be quiet while the adults are talking."
Last edited by Diamondeye on Wed Jun 29, 2011 8:52 am, edited 1 time in total.
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