The Glade 4.0

Well, I see no reason to listen to Bruce Schneier, whoever he is.

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...and he got his degree 25 years ago, nobody should listen to him about anything now, everything he learned back then is antiquated.

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"Dress cops up as soldiers, give them military equipment, train them in military tactics, tell them they’re fighting a ‘war,’ and the consequences are predictable." —Radley Balko

Because computer science doesn't require any security at all. I mean, for ****'s sake, it's not like anyone uses a computer to pay their bills, file their taxes, or check their bank accounts. That's just crazy.

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Buckle your pants or they might fall down.

No, that's clearly not true.

But what IS clearly true is that, computer scientists aren't qualified to secure these things. You can only design secure systems if you know how to pat people down, give cavity searches, and are well armed. I don't recall any classes covering those subjects in my college's CS programs.

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"Aaaah! Emotions are weird!" - Amdee
"... Mirrorshades prevent the forces of normalcy from realizing that one is crazed and possibly dangerous. They are the symbol of the sun-staring visionary, the biker, the rocker, the policeman, and similar outlaws." - Bruce Sterling, preface to Mirrorshades

And a mall cop can write the algorithms for heuristic virus applications, 'cause, you know, he's a security expert...right?


I don't think computer security expertise gives anyone any authority in any other field than computer security.

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In time, this too shall pass.

Very clever, clearly if I can identify and thwart hackers then I am qualified to speak on the likelihood of suicide bombers; international policy and it's effects on security as well as interntional/domestic terrorism.

His theory espouses that terrorism is extremely unlikely based on odds. I'd counter that by saying that the odds that someone will give you their bank account are very low if you claim to be a Nigerian Prince but yet it continues to happen all the time because no one has implemented any counter-measures against it. Along those same lines, if we hadn't changed anything after 9/11 then people would still be hijacking planes with box-cutters because historically it worked and the security holes had not been closed. Similarly if all ESPs banded together and blocked all emails requesting any bank account information then the poor Nigerian Princelings out there would stop sending emails. But that is where trade-offs occur. He thinks we focus on the wrong stuff based on odds but the odds would be different if we didn't respond at all.

As an aside... it'd be interesting to see how Israeli security would stack up against poker players at reading individuals.

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Here is my experience of flying from Ben Gurion. It was a while ago, so may not be entirely accurate; but I think it probably can carry to another region, where clear dividing lines exist for social conflict; i.e. where profiling is possible, even if not ethnic in origin.

I turn up at the airport, in an Arab minicab (Old Jerusalem).
The car is diverted into a separate staging area, presumably for its arab markings.
The car is thoroughly searched, including boot, passenger area and driver, before being permitted to proceed. This takes some time, and clearly irritates the driver.
The car pulls up at the entrance, where a lone, sunglass wearing IDF soldier with an M16 eyeballs me as I get out of the car. I shake the drivers hand and wish him well, feeling bad about the search. The soldier makes a brief hebrew statement over his radio - no idea what, or if related.

I checkin in the airport. My bag is marked with a tag, and I am required to run it through a set of conveyer laden scanners, while I explain why I am in Israel. The scanners are distributed throughout a large space, and queuing is somewhat dispersed. This takes some time. My bag receives another cryptic marking, and I go through the same questions a second time. My passport receives a sticker.

I go through the first checkpoint, and am filtering to my gate, handluggage only this time. The queue divides into three. I am gestured into a 'slow lane', where my bag is swabbed repeatdly, unpacked and repacked courteously, and I am asked the same questions a third time. My hat is analysed. It appears just to be a hat.

Finally, I proceed to the gate.

Now, This entire process was actually considerably more intrusive than that which I get going through US airports, where I am generally fingerprinted, photographed, asked about my business and waved through. On exit (but not entry, bizzarely) from the US, I am forced through some kind of xray machine, but again it is fast, and not burdonsome. Mostly, I am through US customs and security in about 30 minutes. Sometimes it takes up to 90 due to queuing.

It was notably more efficient, in that the queues were short, and the checkpoints worked quickly, but it also had many more stages, and, overall, took longer than the US process. It could be that this is because as a foreigner in an arab cab I got the 'long version'. It might not be. But it isnt clear to be that Israeli security is magically more convenient - though it certainly seems better at trying not to group people in a single area, presumably to minimise bomb impact.