RangerDave wrote:
Couple of notes off the bat:
Yes, https is a different protocol than http. Merely moving the server port to 443 does not make it https.
Quote:
Default Router IP Tests- From inside my home
- [Default Router IP](no port) = prompt for router un/pw.
- [Default Router IP]:XXX with port forwarding enabled = unable to connect.
- [Default Router IP]:XXX with port forwarding disabled = unable to connect.
- From outside source
- [Default Router IP](no port) = unable to connect.
- [Default Router IP]:XXX with port forwarding enabled = unable to connect.
- [Default Router IP]:XXX with port forwarding disabled = unable to connect.
This is expected behavior. Internally, you do not have a redirect for the LAN IP of the router to the camera. Nor should you, that would just be weird. Externally, you're attempting to access non-routable IP space, which doesn't work.
Quote:
Internet IP Tests- From inside my home
- [Internet IP](no port) = prompt for router un/pw.
- [Internet IP]:XXX with port forwarding enabled = prompt for camera un/pw (see below for potential bypass).
- [Internet IP]:XXX with port forwarding disabled = unable to connect.
- From outside source
- [Internet IP](no port) = unable to connect.
- [Internet IP]:XXX with port forwarding enabled = prompt for camera un/pw (see below for potential bypass).
- [Internet IP]:XXX with port forwarding disabled = haven't been able to try this one yet.
I'm a shade surprised that your router is capable of performing a hair-pin turn and NATting correctly with a source internal destination external stream. That's actually poor behavior, although I'm guessing that consumer-grade gear does that on purpose to make things "just work" and cut down on support queries and complaints. Externally, that's all expected behavior (and apparently you've correctly disabled external access to your router).
Quote:
Camera IP Tests- From inside my home
- [Camera IP](no port) = unable to connect.
- [Camera IP]:XXX with port forwarding enabled = prompt for camera un/pw (see below for potential bypass).
- [Camera IP]:XXX with port forwarding disabled = prompt for camera un/pw (see below for potential bypass).
- From outside source
- [Camera IP](no port) = unable to connect.
- [Camera IP]:XXX with port forwarding enabled = unable to connect.
- [Camera IP]:XXX with port forwarding disabled = haven't been able to try this one yet.
That all looks as expected. Internally, you're directly contacting the camera, so the port forwarding status of the router is irrelevant, it's not in the picture (except inasmuch as it's also operating as your network switch). Externally, you're again attempting to access non-routable IP space, so none of that will work.
I'm guessing that XXXXXXXX.myfoscam.com is simply an A record pointing to your router's WAN IP. The only thing you might want to check (and I can't find that there is one), is to make sure there isn't a hardcoded backdoor password for Foscam cameras. Otherwise, since it seems that the camera's firmware is Linux-based, Foscam should find it fairly simple to produce an https option in the firmware.
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The potential bypass is that whenever you get the prompt for the camera un/pw, if you just hit cancel, the camera interface pops up, but without the video feed. Whenever you try to do anything in the interface (e.g., change the user settings, DDNS settings, UPnP settings, etc.), however, it prompts for the un/pw again and hitting cancel at that point causes a "401 Unauthorized" screen to appear. So, it seems that you can't actually bypass the un/pw to view the feed or make any changes to the settings, but it's still a little disturbing that it allows you to access the interface at all.
I agree that it's unwanted behavior that an unauthenticated party can get any sort of interface at all. I'd check and see if there might not be a firmware upgrade that fixes that, as that's definitely a bug. If not, bug report and make sure they get you a fix.
Quote:
One thing I should note is that, although I don't like the idea of someone being able to access the camera's feed, my biggest concern is that by getting into the camera, they'd somehow be able to get into other devices on my home network (i.e. my computers or the router itself) and then either install malware or sniff meaningful logins (e.g. my bank account, credit card accounts, etc.). Is that an actual risk here, or is the worst-case scenario simply that some creeper could log into my camera and watch me making breakfast (since the camera's in the kitchen)?
Other than the firmware being Linux, I don't know enough about the camera to say. However, the WebUI and the firmware are two separate packages, it looks like. I don't know if there's a way to access the OS of the camera itself. There shouldn't be, and depending on how a code upgrade is performed it might be possible for a malicious party to build a trojaned replacement and drop it on, and then the sky is the limit. However, that's probably not a large worry, especially if you can get a fix for the unauthenticated interface access bug.