The Glade 4.0

How is it an illegal order, though? Are you saying it's illegal for a commander to order a delay in reinforcements for any reason - whether tactical, strategic or diplomatic - or are you saying it's illegal to delay reinforcements for the reasons you believe motivated Obama's decision here?

Facism is not a school of thought, it is a racial slur.

It's not an accusation. It's a statement of fact. The President issued an order that ignored an immediate and imminent threat to sovereign US territory. That order cost American citizens their lives. More to the point, that imminent threat was created by actions of the previous diplomatic officer and the intelligence operations run from that location: the Syrians and Egyptians seem to think we were arming Libyan and other Middle Eastern partisans out of that location. Whatever happened to piss off the locals, the President knew about it.

Facism is not a school of thought, it is a racial slur.

Arathain:

The illegal order, as I understand it, was ordering soldiers, civilians, and operatives actually under fire to not defend themselves and lay down arms. That's why Petraeus bucked the Administration, as I understand it.

Facism is not a school of thought, it is a racial slur.

Arathain:

Soldiers asked to surrender can still return fire if fired upon.

Sure, but it doesn't make it illegal to tell them to surrender.

Facism is not a school of thought, it is a racial slur.

It's illegal to tell them not to defend themselves.

It's also illegal to order them not to give assistance to the US civilians in the structure they were occupying at the time.

(a) Assignment as Combatant Commander.—
(1) The President may assign an officer to serve as the commander of a unified or specified combatant command only if the officer—
(A) has the joint specialty under section 661 of this title; and
(B) has completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment (as defined in section 664 (f) of this title) as a general or flag officer.
(2) The President may waive paragraph (1) in the case of an officer if the President determines that such action is necessary in the national interest.
(b) Responsibilities of Combatant Commanders.—
(1) The commander of a combatant command is responsible to the President and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned to that command by the President or by the Secretary with the approval of the President.
(2) Subject to the direction of the President, the commander of a combatant command—
(A) performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense; and
(B) is directly responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.
(c) Command Authority of Combatant Commanders.—
(1) Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the commander of a combatant command with respect to the commands and forces assigned to that command include the command functions of—
(A) giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics;
(B) prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command;
(C) organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;
(D) employing forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;
(E) assigning command functions to subordinate commanders;
(F) coordinating and approving those aspects of administration and support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; and
(G) exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial, as provided in subsections (e), (f), and (g) of this section and section 822 (a) of this title, respectively.
(2)
(A) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that a commander of a combatant command has sufficient authority, direction, and control over the commands and forces assigned to the command to exercise effective command over those commands and forces. In carrying out this subparagraph, the Secretary shall consult with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(B) The Secretary shall periodically review and, after consultation with the Secretaries of the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commander of the combatant command, assign authority to the commander of the combatant command for those aspects of administration and support that the Secretary considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
(3) If a commander of a combatant command at any time considers his authority, direction, or control with respect to any of the commands or forces assigned to the command to be insufficient to command effectively, the commander shall promptly inform the Secretary of Defense.
(d) Authority Over Subordinate Commanders.— Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense—
(1) commanders of commands and forces assigned to a combatant command are under the authority, direction, and control of, and are responsible to, the commander of the combatant command on all matters for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority under subsection (c);
(2) the commander of a command or force referred to in clause (1) shall communicate with other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority under subsection (c) in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the commander of the combatant command;
(3) other elements of the Department of Defense shall communicate with the commander of a command or force referred to in clause (1) on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority under subsection (c) in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the commander of the combatant command; and
(4) if directed by the commander of the combatant command, the commander of a command or force referred to in clause (1) shall advise the commander of the combatant command of all communications to and from other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has not been assigned authority under subsection (c).
(e) Selection of Subordinate Commanders.—
(1) An officer may be assigned to a position as the commander of a command directly subordinate to the commander of a combatant command or, in the case of such a position that is designated under section 601 of this title as a position of importance and responsibility, may be recommended to the President for assignment to that position, only—
(A) with the concurrence of the commander of the combatant command; and
(B) in accordance with procedures established by the Secretary of Defense.
(2) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement under paragraph (1) for the concurrence of the commander of a combatant command with regard to the assignment (or recommendation for assignment) of a particular officer if the Secretary of Defense determines that such action is in the national interest.
(3) The commander of a combatant command shall—
(A) evaluate the duty performance of each commander of a command directly subordinate to the commander of such combatant command; and
(B) submit the evaluation to the Secretary of the military department concerned and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(4) At least one deputy commander of the combatant command the geographic area of responsibility of which includes the United States shall be a qualified officer of the National Guard who is eligible for promotion to the grade of O–9, unless a National Guard officer is serving as commander of that combatant command.
(f) Combatant Command Staff.—
(1) Each unified and specified combatant command shall have a staff to assist the commander of the command in carrying out his responsibilities. Positions of responsibility on the combatant command staff shall be filled by officers from each of the armed forces having significant forces assigned to the command.
(2) An officer may be assigned to a position on the staff of a combatant command or, in the case of such a position that is designated under section 601 of this title as a position of importance and responsibility, may be recommended to the President for assignment to that position, only—
(A) with the concurrence of the commander of such command; and
(B) in accordance with procedures established by the Secretary of Defense.
(3) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement under paragraph (2) for the concurrence of the commander of a combatant command with regard to the assignment (or recommendation for assignment) of a particular officer to serve on the staff of the combatant command if the Secretary of Defense determines that such action is in the national interest.
(g) Authority to Suspend Subordinates.— In accordance with procedures established by the Secretary of Defense, the commander of a combatant command may suspend from duty and recommend the reassignment of any officer assigned to such combatant command.

You talk about "language matters" frequently,

But why would you give the order to stand down?

You have people, US citizens in harms way, should you not do whatever you have to power to do to ensure their security?

No order was ever issued for those actually being fired at to cease fire. The order given was for the CIA operatives to "stand down" from conducting operations to defend the compound.

The individuals themselves cannot be ordered to not fire back if personally fired at; that isn't even an illegal order because it's not an order by definition. If you ask someone to not shoot back when they, personally, are being fired at it cannot be an order. Self-defense is a right of citizens, and our soldiers and civilian personnel are citizens. You can order a soldier to fight in a way that will result in his death, but you cannot order him to accept being killed by the enemy without fighting back.

Anyhow, the relevant statute that Khross can't seem to cite because it totally contradicts his bullshit assertions is 10 USC 164; Commanders of combatant commands: assignment; powers and duties

Posted below entirely, with relevant portions underlined:

Second there is no law prohibiting any commander from issuing a stand-down or surrender order to his troops (although if the enemy refuses to accept surrender and continues attacking, troops cannot be ordered to stop defending themselves).

Khross:

Your life experiences and credentials mysteriously expand any time you need them to in order to win a dispute. You've even pulled this crap with video games, as if writing mods for Skyrim mean you understand the game better than Numbuk and give you some privilege to tell him what kind of game it is, or lecturing Midgen on SWTOR.

Facism is not a school of thought, it is a racial slur.

But why would you give the order to stand down?

You have people, US citizens in harms way, should you not do whatever you have to power to do to ensure their security?

To prevent escalation you accept your losses, turn tail, and run.

Which is what they were trying to do if I recall correctly. Go in, assist with evacuation, and save some lives. They weren't going to go in and retake the embassy and march forward unto dawn until all of Libya was under US protection.

They were told to *not* do that. The former. Which would have been the right thing to do.

But our government isn't fond of "right things to do" only "politically expedient things to do"

What happened don't sit well with bunches of folks, and I'd put myself in that list.

But why would you give the order to stand down?

You have people, US citizens in harms way, should you not do whatever you have to power to do to ensure their security?

Unrecorded testimony
By Harvey Silverglate
May 11, 2013

Robel Phillipos has been charged with obstruction of justice.

Those concerned with the survival of American civil liberties during the post-9/11 (and now post-Boston Marathon) “age of terror” most commonly fear the federal government’s technical ability to record and store virtually all telephonic and electronic communications. But a more immediate threat to liberty lies in what one particular agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, refuses to record, as Robel Phillipos is now learning the hard way.

Phillipos is a 19-year-old Cambridge resident, former UMass Dartmouth student, and friend of alleged Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. He faces charges of making materially false statements during a series of interviews with FBI agents. If convicted, he could get up to eight years in federal prison and a $250,000 fine.

Phillipos underwent four FBI interviews. He is not alleged to have had any advance knowledge of, much less role in, the bombing itself. The FBI was apparently trying to obtain his information and cooperation concerning the role and knowledge of Dias Kadyrbayev and Azamat Tazhayakov, the two Kazakh students who allegedly found and disposed of Tsarnaev’s backpack and laptop after he was named a suspect in the bombings.

The public and the media should withhold judgment not only as to what Phillipos did or did not do, but also as to what he did or did not say when questioned by FBI agents. Indeed, the public should look skeptically at the accuracy of any FBI claim regarding what transpires in the bureau’s infamous witness interviews. Here’s why.



FBI agents always interview in pairs. One agent asks the questions, while the other writes up what is called a “form 302 report” based on his notes. The 302 report, which the interviewee does not normally see, becomes the official record of the exchange; any interviewee who contests its accuracy risks prosecution for lying to a federal official, a felony. And here is the key problem that throws the accuracy of all such statements and reports into doubt: FBI agents almost never electronically record their interrogations; to do so would be against written policy.

In 2006 the FBI defended its no-electronic-recording policy in an internal memorandum, which The New York Times later made public. The memo in part attempts to defend the policy as logistically necessary, but given that virtually every cellphone today has sound recording capabilities, any “inconvenience” or “non-availability” excuse for not recording seems laughably weak. The more honest — and more terrifying — justification for non-recording given in the memo reads as follows: “. . . perfectly lawful and acceptable interviewing techniques do not always come across in recorded fashion to lay persons as proper means of obtaining information from defendants. Initial resistance may be interpreted as involuntariness and misleading a defendant as to the quality of the evidence against him may appear to be unfair deceit.” Translated from bureaucratese: When viewed in the light of day, recorded witness statements could appear to a reasonable jury of laypersons to have been coercively or misleadingly obtained.

But the FBI leaves out the even more potent criticism of its practice — that such interview tactics seem virtually geared toward establishing as fact what the FBI wanted to hear from the witness. Frightened and confused interviewees, who, if they deny they said what any 302 report claims they uttered, can then be indicted for making false statements. The FBI is thus able to put words into a witness or suspect’s mouth and coerce him to adopt the FBI’s version as his own. The FBI thus establishes the official version of what a witness said, and the pressure on the witness to adhere to the 302 version is enormous. Any deviation, after all, raises the question: “Were you lying during your FBI interview, or are you lying now?”

Unlike the federal government, many states understand that unrecorded testimony must be viewed with skepticism in a fair judicial process. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court requires that a custodial interview be electronically recorded whenever possible. For unrecorded testimony to be admitted at trial, a judge must instruct the jury to be wary of police claims as to what the interviewee did and did not say.

The lesson: As long as the FBI relies solely on its agents’ uncorroborated reports of such interviews, it is difficult to credit the bureau’s version of what was and was not said. Presumably, much more is going to emerge concerning what Phillipos really told his interrogators, and nobody should arrive at any conclusions until all of the evidence, from both sides, has been made public. The FBI is not entitled to any presumption of credibility in these situations.
Harvey Silverglate, a criminal and civil liberties lawyer, is author of “Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent.”

FBI agents always interview in pairs. One agent asks the questions, while the other writes up what is called a “form 302 report” based on his notes. The 302 report, which the interviewee does not normally see, becomes the official record of the exchange; any interviewee who contests its accuracy risks prosecution for lying to a federal official, a felony. And here is the key problem that throws the accuracy of all such statements and reports into doubt: FBI agents almost never electronically record their interrogations; to do so would be against written policy.