DFK! wrote:
This would also require them to no longer enforce the law that the government is claiming unconstitutional. Should they continue to enforce it, the injured party could continue to seek redress up to and including the Supreme Court....His point was that the Executive said "we agree with this decision, we find this law to be unconstitutional" and then went on to enforce it anyway.
I don't think that's correct, DFK. My initial read is that he's saying the injured party is only entitled to seek redress in the District Court:
Scalia Dissent, page 5 wrote:
What the petitioner United States asks us to do in the case before us is exactly what the respondent Windsor asks us to do: not to provide relief from the judgment below but to say that that judgment was correct. And the same was true in the Court of Appeals: Neither party sought to undo the judgment for Windsor, and so that court should have dismissed the appeal (just as we should dismiss) for lack of jurisdiction. Since both parties agreed with the judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York, the suit should have ended there. The further proceedings have been a contrivance, having no object in mind except to elevate a District Court judgment that has no precedential effect in other courts, to one that has precedential effect throughout the Second Circuit, and then (in this Court) precedential effect throughout the United States.
In the portion of his dissent that you quoted (Scalia Dissent, page 9), he goes on to say, "Where the Executive is enforcing an unconstitutional law, suit will of course lie; but if, in that suit, the Executive admits the unconstitutionality of the law, the litigation should end in an order or a consent decree enjoining enforcement." However, as noted above, that order or consent decree will be at the District Court level, meaning it would have no precedential effect. Moreover, since Scalia is saying there's no controversy over the constitutionality of the law for the courts to adjudicate, even that District Court order should be one that simply enjoins enforcement against the particular plaintiff in the case. And that's the flaw I'm pointing out. Under Scalia's approach, if the government concedes that a law is unconstitutional but enforces it anyway, the only remedy available in the courts would be for individual plaintiffs to obtain a District Court order enjoining enforcement against them, which order would have no general applicability or precedential effect. Rinse and repeat whenever someone has the time, money and knowledge to actually file suit (which won't be the case for the vast majority of people), and the government would be free to continue enforcing the admittedly unconstitutional law against everyone else indefinitely, with no ability for the courts to ever strike down the law.