Arathain Kelvar wrote:
I honestly hate to dogpile, but this is the cost of weak foreign policy leadership. Time and time again we threaten, nothing happens. Why would anyone be worried?
Further, the next few months are what matters. If Russia invades, and we kick them out of the G8 or whatever, who cares? They will have been there long enough for the pro-Russian forces to take control of the area, and then when Russia leaves, it's a second pro-Russian autonomous region. Then we declare victory and remove sanctions from Russia, and all is well.
I think there's something to this line of criticism - after all, that's exactly what happened with Georgia, so it's reasonable to conclude that Putin is probably counting on the same thing happening here. In addition, it's been a common cultural belief among Russians since at least WWII that the West is soft and weak by comparison to them. However, I think there are a few important counterpoints:
First, the simple reality is that the US and the EU care less about what happens on Russia's doorstep than Russia does. The perceived weakness of our foreign policy in that arena is to a large extent just a reflection of that fundamental asymmetry of interests, not of any particular policy failure.
Second, from the perspective of a Russian nationalist like Putin, US/EU policy in Eastern Europe and other parts of the former Soviet sphere of influence has been infuriatingly aggressive, not invitingly weak. Since the Cold War ended, NATO and the EU have expanded steadily eastward, literally to the borders of Russia in some places, and in recent years, the US has established bases and fly-over rights in several former Soviet republics on Russia's southern borders (near Afghanistan) as well. Of course, the expansion of NATO and the EU has been voluntary and, for the most part, democratic, but in a pure realpolitik sense, it's an increase in Western power coming at the expense of Russian power.
Third, Russia, like any major power, has its own long-term agenda to play out, in some ways irrespective of the US/EU policy footing at any given time. Putin's ultimate foreign policy goal is to re-establish Russia as the dominant player at the center of a political, military, economic and cultural empire / alliance. He essentially wants a new Warsaw Pact, centered on Russia, to rival the US, the EU and China as one of the "poles" in an increasingly multipolar world. Keeping the Ukraine within the Russian orbit is crucial to that vision, so when the pro-Russian Ukrainian government was toppled by a pro-EU protest movement, Putin was strongly motivated to take aggressive action to stem the tide and make the Ukrainians (and anyone else who might be getting ideas) think twice about trying to leave the Russian sphere of influence. The relative strength or weakness of the western response - which no one thinks will involve going to war - is very much a secondary concern in that analysis.
And finally, there's a shit-ton of historical and cultural baggage between Russia and the Ukraine that makes a lot of their rational calculations take a back seat to gut-level responses on both sides, further limiting the relevance of US/EU policy and reputation in the build-up to (and possibly the resolution of) the crisis.