Diamondeye:
You've claimed to have read the case, but require someone else to provide a link?
Very well ...
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case? ... i=scholarrThere's you link to the decision in full.
First, you should note that the question at hand was whether or not the officers conducted a search. That was, amusingly, the sole question before the Supreme Court of the United States:
Quote:
*1414 We granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the officers' behavior was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 995, 181 L.Ed.2d 726 (2012).
You should read all of section III in toto, because Scalia limits the Katz decision, limits the effects of decisions affecting other things, including your vehicle. Katz, per the Jardines decision, can only make it more difficult for the government to get a warrant, not less.
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The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." The Amendment establishes a simple baseline, one that for much of our history formed the exclusive basis for its protections: When "the Government obtains information by physically intruding" on persons, houses, papers, or effects, "a `search' within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment" has "undoubtedly occurred." United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, ___, n. 3, 132 S.Ct. 945, 950-951, n. 3, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). By reason of our decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), property rights "are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations," Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) — but though Katz may add to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the Amendment's protections "when the Government does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area," United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
The following paragraph from Section III, however, is money ...
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Just last Term, we considered an argument much like this. Jones held that tracking an automobile's whereabouts using a physically-mounted GPS receiver is a Fourth Amendment search. The Government argued that the Katz standard "show[ed] that no search occurred," as the defendant had "no `reasonable expectation of privacy'" in his whereabouts on the public roads, Jones, 565 U.S., at ___, 132 S.Ct., at 950 — a proposition with at least as much support in our case law as the one the State marshals here. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983). But because the GPS receiver had been physically mounted on the defendant's automobile (thus intruding on his "effects"), we held that tracking the vehicle's movements was a search: a person's "Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation." Jones, supra, at ___, 132 S.Ct., at 950. The Katz reasonable expectations test "has been added to, not substituted for," the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment, and so is unnecessary to consider when the government gains evidence by physically intruding on constitutionally protected areas. Jones, supra, at ___, 132 S.Ct., at 951-952.
The key phrase is in parentheses -- "thus intruding on his 'effects'." The car is an effect. U.S. v. Jones decision actually does more harm to canine searches than anything else, because actually application would prevent them from bringing the dog close enough without implicit or explicit permission.
Scalia used the Jones precedent in Florida v. Jardines.
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