The Glade 4.0

Introduction
American economics transformed itself during the Progressive Era. In the
three to four decades after 1890, American economics became an expert policy
science and academic economists played a leading role in bringing about a vastly
more expansive state role in the American economy. By World War I, the U.S.
government amended the Constitution to institute a personal income tax, created
the Federal Reserve, applied antitrust laws, restricted immigration and began
regulation of food and drug safety. State governments, where the reform impulse
was stronger still, regulated working conditions, banned child labor, instituted
“mothers’ pensions,” capped working hours and set minimum wages.
Less well known is that a crude eugenic sorting of groups into deserving and
undeserving classes crucially informed the labor and immigration reform that is the
hallmark of the Progressive Era (Leonard, 2003). Reform-minded economists of
the Progressive Era defended exclusionary labor and immigration legislation on
grounds that the labor force should be rid of unfit workers, whom they labeled
“parasites,” “the unemployable,” “low-wage races” and the “industrial residuum.”
Removing the unfit, went the argument, would uplift superior, deserving workers.
“Eugenics” describes a movement to improve human heredity by the social
control of human breeding, based on the assumption that differences in human
intelligence, character and temperament are largely due to differences in heredity
(Paul, 2001). Francis Galton, statistical innovator and half-cousin of Charles Darwin,
is regarded as the founder of modern eugenics. Eugenics’ “first object,” said
Galton (1908, p. 323), “is to check the birth rate of the unfit instead of allowing
them to come into being . . . the second object is the improvement of the race by
furthering the productivity of the fit by early marriages and the healthful rearing of
children.”
In the United States especially, Progressive Era eugenics tended to be racist.
But “race” had connotations in the Progressive Era different than those of today,
and eugenicists of that time were both imprecise and inconsistent in their use of the
term. Sometimes the term refers to all of humankind—the human race. Sometimes
“race” was used in something like its modern sense. But more commonly, the
Progressive Era usage of “race” meant ethnicity or nationality, especially when
distinguishing among Europeans, so that the English, or those of Anglo-Saxon
ethnicity, were presumed to be a race distinct from, say, the Irish race or the Italian
race. The most influential racial taxonomy of the day, The Races of Europe, was
written by William Z. Ripley (1899), an economist trained at MIT and Columbia,
who spent a long career at Harvard studying railroad economics and served, in
1933, as president of the American Economic Association (AEA).1
Race did not exhaust the variants of human hierarchy embraced by American
eugenicists, whose catalogue of unfit persons often included women and the lower
classes. Eugenicists were also gravely concerned with those they regarded as deficient
in intellect—for example, epileptics, the mentally ill and the “feebleminded”—
and those they regarded as deficient in character—“the criminals and
the incorrigibly idle . . . [the] morally deficient . . . and [those] incapable of
producing their maintenance at any application whatsoever” (Webb and Webb
1920 [1897], p. 785).
During the Progressive Era, eugenic approaches to social and economic reform
were popular, respectable and widespread. This essay documents the influence
of eugenic ideas upon American economic reform, especially in the areas of
immigration and labor reform, and tries to illuminate something of its causes and
consequences. Though our focus is upon economics, eugenics appealed no less,
and arguably more, to scholars in the other emerging sciences of society, especially sociology and psychology. A fuller treatment is available in Leonard (2003), upon
which this essay draws.

Immigration and “Race Suicide”
It was a scholarly fashion, circa 1890, to declare the U.S. frontier “closed” and
to sound a Malthusian alarm about excess American population growth. But the
professional economists who wrote on immigration increasingly emphasized not
the quantity of immigrants, but their quality. “If we could leave out of account the
question of race and eugenics,” Irving Fisher (1921, pp. 226–227) said in his
presidential address to the Eugenics Research Association, “I should, as an economist,
be inclined to the view that unrestricted immigration . . . is economically
advantageous to the country as a whole . . . .” But, cautioned Fisher, “the core of the
problem of immigration is . . . one of race and eugenics,” the problem of the
Anglo-Saxon racial stock being overwhelmed by racially inferior “defectives, delinquents
and dependents.”
Fear and dislike of immigrants certainly were not new in the Progressive Era.
But leading professional economists were among the first to provide scientific
respectability for immigration restriction on racial grounds.2 They justified racebased
immigration restriction as a remedy for “race suicide,” a Progressive Era term
for the process by which racially superior stock (“natives”) is outbred by a more
prolific, but racially inferior stock (immigrants). The term “race suicide” is often
attributed to Edward A. Ross (1901a, p. 88), who believed that “the higher race
quietly and unmurmuringly eliminates itself rather than endure individually the
bitter competition it has failed to ward off by collective action.” Ross was no outlier.
He was a founding member of the American Economic Association, a pioneering
sociologist and a leading public intellectual who boasted that his books sold in the
hundreds of thousands.3 Ross’s coinage gained enough currency to be used by
Theodore Roosevelt (1907, p. 550), who called race suicide the “greatest problem
of civilization,” and regularly returned to the theme of “the elimination instead of
the survival of the fittest.” In that same year, more than 40 years after the American
Civil War, Ross (1907, p. 715) wrote: “The theory that races are virtually equal in
capacity leads to such monumental follies as lining the valleys of the South with the
bones of half a million picked whites in order to improve the conditions of four
million unpicked blacks.”
Ross’s (1901b) theory was that the “native” Anglo-Saxon stock was biologically
well-adapted to rural, traditional life, but less well-suited to the new urban milieu of
industrial capitalism. In his view, the racially inferior immigrant races, “Latins,
Slavs, Asiatics, and Hebrews,” were better adapted to the conditions of industrial
capitalism and thus would outbreed the superior Anglo-Saxon race. The racesuicide
proposition that persons of inferior stock outbreed their biological betters
turns Darwinism on its head, since Darwinism defines fitness as relative reproductive
success. Progressive Era eugenics, in contrast argued that fitness comprised attributes,
such as race, that could be judged independently of reproductive success.
Indeed, race-suicide theory was predicated on what Darwinism denies, what eugenicists
called the “elimination of the fit.”
By 1912, Simon Patten (p. 64), the reformist Wharton School economist who
served as AEA president in 1908, could say, “[T]he cry of race suicide has replaced
the old fear of overpopulation.” In explaining why those of inferior stock were
more prolific, early Progressive Era economists emphasized how economic life
under industrial capitalism was increasingly dysgenic, that is, it tended to promote
the survival of the unfit. Patten, for example, argued (as quoted in D. Ross, 1991,
p. 197) that “every improvement . . . increases the amount of the deficiencies which
the laboring classes may possess without their being thereby overcome in the
struggle for subsistence that the survival of the ignorant brings upon society.”
In response, Patten ultimately argued for the state taking over the task of
selecting the fittest—eugenics. “Social progress is a higher law than equality,”
Patten (1899, pp. 302–303) volunteered, and the only way to progress was the
“eradication of the vicious and inefficient.” Frank Fetter (1899, p. 237), who was to
serve as president of the AEA in 1912, also worried that “the benefits of social
progress are being neutralized by race degeneration” owing to the “suspension of
the selective process.”
Henry Farnam, who cofounded the American Association for Labor Legislation
(AALL), an influential reform organization led by academic economists, and
later served as the AEA president in 1911, emphasized aid to the poor as a cause of
dysgenic selection: “[W ]e are,” Farnam (1888, p. 295) proposed, “by means of our
very improvements, setting forces in operation which tend to multiply the unfit.”
The increase in the unfit, Farnam concluded, “render[s] more and more imperative
the solution of that exceedingly difficult problem which Mr. Arnold White calls
‘sterilization of the unfit.’”
Ross, Patten, Fetter and Farnam all saw higher living standards and Progressive
Era reforms less as a victory for social justice than as an impediment to Darwinian
weeding out. Their response was not to argue against reform, as might a social
Darwinist, but to advocate for eugenics, the substitution of state selection for
natural selection of the fittest.
Francis Amasa Walker offered a race-suicide account that proved especially
influential in the immigration debate. Walker was a decorated Civil War hero,
served as president of MIT from 1881 to 1897, directed the U.S. Census in 1870 and
in 1880, served as the AEA’s first president from 1886 to 1892 and was the most
respected American economist at the beginning of the Progressive Era. Walker’s
race-suicide theory argued that immigration limited the natural fertility of the
“native” population—by which he meant earlier European immigrants of Anglo-
Saxon ethnicity—so that inferior foreign-born stock effectively displaced superior
native stock. “The native element failed to maintain its previous rate of increase,”
says Walker (1899, p. 423), “because the foreigners came in such swarms.”
Walker (1899, p. 424) proposed that native Americans would not compete with
immigrants from the “low-wage races.” “The American shrank from the industrial
competition thrust upon him,” Walker argued. “He was unwilling himself to engage
with the lowest kind of day labor with these new elements of the population; he was
even more unwilling to brings sons and daughters into the world to enter that
competition.” Walker (1896, p. 828) characterized the new elements of the population—“
peasants” from “southern Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Russia”—as “beaten
men from beaten races; representing the worst failures in the struggle for existence.
Centuries are against them, as centuries were on the side of those who formerly
came to us.” Walker (1899, p. 447) predicted that, without racial immigration
restriction, “every foul and stagnant pool of population in Europe, [in] which no
breath of intellectual life has stirred for ages . . . [will] be decanted upon our
shores.”
Like Fisher, Ross, Patten, Fetter and Farnam, Walker endorsed eugenic policies.
“We must strain out of the blood of the race more of the taint inherited from
a bad and vicious past,” Walker (1899, p. 469) proposed, “before we can eliminate
poverty, much more pauperism, from our social life. The scientific treatment which
is applied to physical diseases must be extended to mental and moral disease, and
a wholesome surgery and cautery must be enforced by the whole power of the state
for the good of all.”4
Eugenics to one side, Walker was, for his time, a sophisticated student of
population. Walker found that early nineteenth-century population forecasts for
1840 and 1850 assumed little immigration, but were nonetheless quite accurate.
Noting that a relatively large increase in immigration had occurred during the
1830–1839 and 1840–1849 decades, Walker (1899, p. 422) concluded that theunanticipated immigration must have induced a native decline in birth rate, otherwise
the forecasts, in assuming little immigration, would have underestimated the
total population. A few critics disagreed, saying that native fertility began declining
well before immigration increased and that the causes lay in increased urbanization,
higher living standards and later age of marriage (Goldenweiser, 1912). Those
critics were ignored. Whatever the merits of Walker’s case viewed from today, it is
important to note that even sophisticated students of population embraced racesuicide
theory and eugenic solutions to it.
Race-suicide theories were popular abroad as well. In England, for example,
Fabian socialist Sidney Webb (1907, p. 17) devised a novel term, “adverse selection,”
to describe what he saw as English race suicide: “Twenty-five percent of our
parents, as Professor Karl Pearson keeps warning us, is producing 50 percent of the
next generation. This can hardly result in anything but national deterioration; or,
as an alternative, in this country gradually falling to the Irish and the Jews.”
In the latter half of the Progressive Era, race-suicide and proposed eugenic
solutions had enough currency to appear in leading textbooks. In his Elementary
Principles, Irving Fisher (1907, p. 715) declared that “if the vitality or vital capital is
impaired by a breeding of the worst and a cessation of the breeding of the best, no
greater calamity could be imagined.” Fortunately, said Fisher, eugenics offered a
means, “by isolation in public institutions and in some cases by surgical operation,”
to prevent the calamity of “inheritable taint.” Similarly, Frank Fetter (1918,
pp. 421–422) lamented in his Economic Principles, “Democracy and opportunity
[are] increasing the mediocre and reducing the excellent strains of stock . . . .
Progress is threatened unless social institutions can be so adjusted as to reverse this
process of multiplying the poorest, and of extinguishing the most capable families.”
Eugenic policies would introduce, Fetter argued, “an element of rational direction
into the process of perpetuating the race . . . .”
The Eugenic Effects of Minimum Wage Laws
During the second half of the Progressive Era, beginning roughly in 1908,
progressive economists and their reform allies achieved many statutory victories,
including state laws that regulated working conditions, banned child labor, instituted
“mothers’ pensions,” capped working hours and, the sine qua non, fixed
minimum wages. In using eugenics to justify exclusionary immigration legislation,
the race-suicide theorists offered a model to economists advocating labor reforms,
notably those affiliated with the American Association for Labor Legislation, the
organization of academic economists that Orloff and Skocpol (1984, p. 726) call
the “leading association of U.S. social reform advocates in the Progressive Era.”
Progressive economists, like their neoclassical critics, believed that binding
minimum wages would cause job losses. However, the progressive economists also
believed that the job loss induced by minimum wages was a social benefit, as itperformed the eugenic service ridding the labor force of the “unemployable.”
Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1897 [1920], p. 785) put it plainly: “With regard to
certain sections of the population [the “unemployable”], this unemployment is not
a mark of social disease, but actually of social health.” “[O]f all ways of dealing with
these unfortunate parasites,” Sidney Webb (1912, p. 992) opined in the Journal of
Political Economy, “the most ruinous to the community is to allow them to unrestrainedly
compete as wage earners.” A minimum wage was seen to operate eugenically
through two channels: by deterring prospective immigrants (Henderson,
1900) and also by removing from employment the “unemployable,” who, thus
identified, could be, for example, segregated in rural communities or sterilized.
The notion that minimum-wage induced disemployment is a social benefit
distinguishes its progressive proponents from their neoclassical critics, such as
Alfred Marshall (1897), Philip Wicksteed (1913), A. C. Pigou (1913) and John Bates
Clark (1913), who regarded job loss as a social cost of minimum wages, not as a
putative social benefit (Leonard, 2000).
Columbia’s Henry Rogers Seager, a leading progressive economist who served
as president of the AEA in 1922, provides an example. Worthy wage-earners, Seager
(1913a, p. 12) argued, need protection from the “wearing competition of the casual
worker and the drifter” and from the other “unemployable” who unfairly drag
down the wages of more deserving workers (1913b, pp. 82–83). The minimum
wage protects deserving workers from the competition of the unfit by making it
illegal to work for less. Seager (1913a, p. 9) wrote: “The operation of the minimum
wage requirement would merely extend the definition of defectives to embrace all
individuals, who even after having received special training, remain incapable of
adequate self-support.” Seager (p. 10) made clear what should happen to those
who, even after remedial training, could not earn the legal minimum: “If we are to
maintain a race that is to be made of up of capable, efficient and independent
individuals and family groups we must courageously cut off lines of heredity that
have been proved to be undesirable by isolation or sterilization . . . .”
The unemployable were thus those workers who earned less than some measure
of an adequate standard of living, a standard the British called a “decent
maintenance” and Americans referred to as a “living wage.” For labor reformers,
firms that paid workers less than the living wage to which they were entitled were
deemed parasitic, as were the workers who accepted such wages—on grounds that
someone (charity, state, other members of the household) would need to make up
the difference.
For progressives, a legal minimum wage had the useful property of sorting the
unfit, who would lose their jobs, from the deserving workers, who would retain their
jobs. Royal Meeker, a Princeton economist who served as Woodrow Wilson’s U.S.
Commissioner of Labor, opposed a proposal to subsidize the wages of poor workers
for this reason. Meeker preferred a wage floor because it would disemploy unfit
workers and thereby enable their culling from the work force. “It is much better to
enact a minimum-wage law even if it deprives these unfortunates of work,” arguedMeeker (1910, p. 554). “Better that the state should support the inefficient wholly
and prevent the multiplication of the breed than subsidize incompetence and
unthrift, enabling them to bring forth more of their kind.” A. B. Wolfe (1917,
p. 278), an American progressive economist who would later become president of
the AEA in 1943, also argued for the eugenic virtues of removing from employment
those who “are a burden on society.”
In his Principles of Economics, Frank Taussig (1921, pp. 332–333) asked rhetorically,
“how to deal with the unemployable?” Taussig identified two classes of
unemployable worker, distinguishing the aged, infirm and disabled from the
“feebleminded . . . those saturated with alcohol or tainted with hereditary disease
. . . [and] the irretrievable criminals and tramps. . . .” The latter class, Taussig
proposed, “should simply be stamped out.” “We have not reached the stage,”
Taussig allowed, “where we can proceed to chloroform them once and for all; but
at least they can be segregated, shut up in refuges and asylums, and prevented from
propagating their kind.”5
The progressive idea that the unemployable could not earn a living wage was
bound up with the progressive view of wage determination. Unlike the economists
who pioneered the still-novel marginal productivity theory, most progressives
agreed that wages should be determined by the amount that was necessary to
provide a reasonable standard of living, not by productivity, and that the cost of this
entitlement should fall on firms.6
But how should a living wage be determined? Were workers with more dependents,
and thus higher living expenses, thereby entitled to higher wages? Arguing
that wages should be a matter of an appropriate standard of living opened the door,
in this era of eugenics, to theories of wage determination that were grounded in
biology, in particular to the idea that “low-wage races” were biologically predisposed
to low wages, or “under-living.”7 Edward A. Ross (1936, p. 70), the proponent of
race-suicide theory, argued that “the Coolie cannot outdo the American, but he can
underlive him.” “Native” workers have higher productivity, claimed Ross, but
because Chinese immigrants are racially disposed to work for lower wages, they
displace the native workers.In his Races and Immigrants, the University of Wisconsin economist and social
reformer John R. Commons argued that wage competition not only lowers wages,
it also selects for the unfit races. “The competition has no respect for the superior
races,” said Commons (1907, p. 151), “the race with lowest necessities displaces
others.” Because race rather than productivity determined living standards, Commons
could populate his low-wage-races category with the industrious and lazy
alike. African Americans were, for Commons (p. 136), “indolent and fickle,” which
explained why, Commons argued, slavery was required: “The negro could not
possibly have found a place in American industry had he come as a free man . . .
[I ]f such races are to adopt that industrious life which is second nature to races of
the temperate zones, it is only through some form of compulsion.” Similarly,
Wharton School reformer Scott Nearing (1915, p. 22), volunteered that if “an
employer has a Scotchman working for him at $3 a day [and] an equally efficient
Lithuanian offers to the same work for $2 . . . the work is given to the low bidder.”
When U.S. labor reformers reported on labor legislation in countries more
precocious with respect to labor reform, they favorably commented on the eugenic
efficacy of minimum wages in excluding the “low-wage races” from work. Harvard’s
Arthur Holcombe (1912, p. 21), a member of the Massachusetts Minimum Wage
Commission, referred approvingly to the intent of Australia’s minimum wage law to
“protect the white Australian’s standard of living from the invidious competition of
the colored races, particularly of the Chinese.” Florence Kelley (1911, p. 304),
perhaps the most influential U.S. labor reformer of the day, also endorsed the
Australian minimum-wage law as “redeeming the sweated trades” by preventing the
“unbridled competition” of the unemployable, the “women, children, and Chinese
[who] were reducing all the employees to starvation . . .”
For these progressives, race determined the standard of living, and the standard
of living determined the wage. Thus were immigration restriction and labor
legislation, especially minimum wages, justified for their eugenic effects. Invidious
distinction, whether founded on the putatively greater fertility of the unfit, or upon
their putatively greater predisposition to low wages, lay at the heart of the reforms
we today see as the hallmark of the Progressive Era.
The Popularity and Appeal of Eugenics
For modern readers, the Progressive Era relationship between American reform
and the biology of human inheritance is doubly unexpected: first, that
eugenics was so popular and respectable, and second, that so many progressive
economists should have been attracted to eugenic explanations. Let us consider
these surprises in turn.
The Popularity of Eugenics
“Eugenics” is a dirty word in contemporary discourse, largely because of its
association with the eugenic atrocities of German National Socialism. Even professional historians find it difficult to resist the temptation to read all pre-Nazi history
of eugenics as a prelude to Nazi crimes. But Progressive Era eugenics was, in fact,
the broadest of churches. It was mainstream; it was popular to the point of
faddishness; it was supported by leading figures in the newly emerging science of
genetics; it appealed to an extraordinary range of political ideologies, not just
progressives; and it survived the Nazis.
In 1928, 376 college courses were dedicated to the subject of eugenics (Allen,
1983, p. 116). A single text among many, Searchlights on Health, the Science of Eugenics,
sold one million copies in the first two years of its publication (Proctor, 1991,
p. 201, n. 28). The American Eugenics Society, co-founded by Irving Fisher to
educate Americans on the virtues of eugenics, set up instructional pavilions and
staged “fitter family” competitions at state agricultural fairs.
Progressive Era eugenic ideas were influential in nearly all non-Catholic
western countries and in many others besides. We today have scholarly treatments
of eugenics movements in Canada (McLaren, 1990), France (Schneider, 1990),
Japan (Suzuki, 1975), Russia (Adams, 1990), Scandinavian countries (Broberg and
Roll-Hansen, 1996), Romania (Bucur, 2002), Latin America (Stepan, 1991) and
China (Diko¨tter, 1992). In 1933, Paul Popenoe, a founder of American demography
and a leading eugenicist, could boast that eugenic sterilization laws obtained in
jurisdictions comprising 150 million people (Kevles, 1995, p. 115). Eugenic sentiments
can even be found among scholars from traditionally black colleges. Miller
(1917) worried about the lower fertility of the Howard University professoriate—
“the higher element of the negro race”—when compared with the average African
American.
Eugenics found advocates whose ideologies spanned the entire political spectrum.
The eugenics movement attracted some reactionaries and conservatives.
Leading eugenicists, such as Francis Galton and Charles Davenport, director of the
Eugenics Record Office at the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, can be described as
social conservatives. But others, such as Karl Pearson, were socialists. Eugenics won
many advocates on the left, such as birth control advocate Margaret Sanger, who
began intellectual life as a radical anarchist. Fabian socialists such as Sidney Webb,
George Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells were eugenicists, as were Harold Laski and
John Maynard Keynes (Paul, 1984). The Marxist economist Scott Nearing (1912)
and the feminist economist Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1900) also embraced
eugenics.
Many biologists were drawn to eugenics. For example, David Starr Jordan,
president of Stanford, was a tireless advocate of the eugenic idea that “the blood of
nation determines its history,” as was Harvard geneticist and eugenicist E.M. East
(Jordan, 1902, p. 1). In fact, Paul and Spencer (1995, p. 302) report that before the
1930s, Thomas Hunt Morgan, pioneer in fruit-fly studies and Nobel laureate in
physiology and medicine in 1933, was the only geneticist to reject publicly the
eugenicist idea that socially undesirable traits were the product of bad heredity.Why Did Eugenics Appeal to the Progressives?
Eugenic ideas were not new in the Progressive Era, but they acquired new
impetus with the Progressive Era advent of a more expansive government. In effect,
the expansion of state power meant that it became possible to have not only
eugenic thought, but also eugenic practice. As eugenics historian Diane Paul (1995,
p. 6) writes, eugenics legislation had to await “the rise of the welfare state.”
Progressives were drawn to eugenics by the same set of intellectual commitments
that drew them to reform legislation. Paramount was the reform idea that
laissez-faire was bankrupt. Sidney Webb (1910–1911, p. 237) said flatly, “[N]o
consistent eugenicist can be a ‘Laisser Faire’ individualist unless he throws up the
game in despair. He must interfere, interfere, interfere!” Similarly, Frank Fetter
(1907, pp. 92–93) pronounced at the AEA meetings: “Unless effective means are
found to check the degeneration of the race, the noontide of humanity’s greatness
is nigh, if not already passed. Our optimism must be based not upon laissez-faire,”
said Fetter, “but upon vigorous application of science, humanity, and legislative art
to the solution of the problem.”
Progressive opposition to laissez faire was motivated by a set of deep intellectual
commitments regarding the relationship between social science, social scientific
expertise and right governance. The progressives were committed to 1) the
explanatory power of scientific (especially statistical) social inquiry to get at the root
causes of social and economic problems; 2) the legitimacy of social control, which
derives from a holist conception of society as prior to and greater than the sum of
its constituent individuals; 3) the efficacy of social control via expert management
of public administration; where 4) expertise is both sufficient and necessary for the
task of wise public administration.
It is no accident that so many notable eugenicists were pioneers in statistics.
Francis Galton, Karl Pearson and Ronald A. Fisher were all founders of modern
statistics and were, in addition, leading lights in the eugenics movement. Many
proponents of eugenics in economics were also statistically oriented. Francis Amasa
Walker, Richmond Mayo-Smith, Irving Fisher and Walter Wilcox were all statisticians,
by training and/or by inclination. They regarded statistical measurement and
inference as the method that put the “science” in social science.
Karl Pearson’s (1909, pp. 19–20) “bricks for the foundations” of eugenics
emphasized statistical methods as the guarantor of better social science: “[first] we
depart from the old sociology, in that we desert verbal discussion for statistical facts,
and [second] we apply new methods of statistics which form practically a new
calculus.” American progressives also saw statistics as providing a scientific foundation
for their legislative reforms. Said reformer Lester Ward (1915, p. 46): “if laws
of social events could be statistically formulated, they could be used for scientific
lawmaking.”
The progressives also believed strongly in the legitimacy of “social control,” a
catch phrase of Progressive Era reformers, as it was for their successors, the
Institutionalists. “Social control” did not refer narrowly to state regulation ofmarkets. Edward A. Ross (1901b), who popularized the term, employed it in a
broader sociological sense, to describe the various ways in which society “can mold
the individual to the necessity of the group,” which, in the context of his eugenics,
meant a “program for survival” of the Anglo-Saxon race (as quoted in Furner, 1975,
p. 309).
The legitimacy of social control meant, in practice, the legitimacy of state
control. For progressives, the legitimacy of state control derived from their conception
of the state as an entity prior to and greater than the sum of its constituent
individuals, a conception that opposed the traditional liberal emphasis on individual
freedom and the liberal view that the state’s legitimacy derives solely from the
consent of its individual creators. Lester Ward devised the term “sociocracy” to
describe the “scientific control of the social forces by the collective mind of society”
(Fine, 1956, p. 263).
The progressives’ somewhat antidemocratic impulses also led them to believe
that academic experts were both sufficient and necessary for the task of wise public
administration, because they could and would suspend their own interests to
transcend the messy business of democratic politics. As one widely read eugenics
text put it: “[G]overnment and social control are in the hands of expert politicians
who have power, instead of expert technologists who have wisdom. There should be
technologists in control of every field of human need and desire” (as quoted from
Albert Wiggam’s New Decalogue 1923, in Ludmerer, 1972, pp. 16–17). The case for
technocratic governance was put baldly by Irving Fisher (1907, p. 20): “The world
consists of two classes—the educated and the ignorant—and it is essential for
progress that the former should be allowed to dominate the latter. . . . [O]nce we
admit that it is proper for the instructed classes to give tuition to the uninstructed,
we begin to see an almost boundless vista for possible human betterment.” Thus
were eugenics and progressivism complementary rather than antagonistic trends in
the United States during the Progressive Era (Searle, 1998, pp. 25–26).
It is a temptation to regard progressive thought of a century ago as akin to
contemporary progressivism, but Progressive Era progressives viewed the poor and
disenfranchised with great ambivalence. Many clearly believed that defective heredity
offered a basis for sorting the worthy poor from the unworthy poor and that
uplift of the worthy poor required eugenic control of the unworthy poor. Consider
Popenoe and Johnson’s very successful Applied Eugenics (1918), published as part of
the Social Science textbook series edited by Richard T. Ely. Popenoe and Johnson
argued for legislation that would abolish child labor and provide education for all
children, quintessentially progressive policies. But compulsory education and child
labor bans, for Popenoe and Johnson, were desirable because the unfit poor would
be unable to put their children to work and thus would have fewer children, a
eugenic goal. Indeed, Popenoe and Johnson opposed free school lunches and
textbooks for the poor on the grounds that subsidies of books and lunches would
lower the cost of child rearing and thereby increase the number of children born
to the unfit.Similarly, Emily Greene Balch, a Wellesley College economist and future
winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1946 for her role as a peace activist, made the
eugenic case against subsidies for poor school children. “If you simply want to have
more people . . . depraved people quite as well as any other class,” said Balch (1907,
p. 102), then “feeding school children [is] a good thing; but if you believe it is
important . . . to have more of the right kind of people, then any measure of
encouragement should be most carefully selective in character.” That progressives
could oppose subsidies for poor schoolchildren reveals the extent to which eugenics
informed American Progressive Era reform.
. . .
The hubris of Progressive Era eugenics was twofold. First, the naı¨ve faith that
science would prove a cure-all for social ills, which led to overreaching by eugenicists
and those social scientists who appealed their authority, and second, the naı¨ve
faith that the state, as guided by experts, would prove to be the best guarantor of
human biological progress, a faith Myrdal (1944, p. 1024) avowed in his valedictory to
The American Dilemma: “We have today in social science a greater faith in the improvability
of man and society than we have ever had since the Enlightenment.”

Source: Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 19, Number 4—Fall 2005—Pages 207–224