The author certainly is pointing out the dangers of appeasement correctly, especially with respect to Iran.
Although Iran is not Arab, many basic tenets of culture are similar. In the Middle East, strength and influence (
wasta, in Arabic, don't know the Farsi word) are very important, and being in a position of weakness invites, and makes it acceptable to, take advantage of the weak party.
In the same vein, it is very important to do what you say you will do. If you claim you're going to kick someone's ***, then you kick their ***
in detail. That indicates strength. What indicates even greater strength is to reach out in a positive way to someone
after you kick their ***. What the author is pointing out is that we haven't kicked Iran's *** yet, but we're still at odds with them. Therefore, positive gestures and conciliation indicte weakness to them. They know we are not going to kick their ***.
The author also is correct about the difficulties facing Israel in conducting a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities; most importantly the distance and the huge upgrade that delivery of S-300 SAMs from Russia will be for Iranian air defenses.
The author does, however, have a poorer grasp on some other aspects.
For one thing, he complains about the loss of missile defense in Europe. Aside from the fact that Russia is not Iran and the Russians are not likely to see it as a gesture of weakness or strength since the 10 interceptors weren't enough to make a **** against Russia, he underestimates greatly the usefulness of our
SM-3 missile based on Aegis -equipped
Ticonderoga and
Arleigh Burke class ships. Some of you may remember this missile downing a satellite in 2008. That interception was performed at a closing velocity of more than 22,000 mph; easily placing ICBMs within its performance envelope; the missile is
not limited to short-ranged missiles as the author implies. There are differences between intercepting a satellite and an ICBM but if you can physically accomplish one you can generally accomplish the other (satellites orbiting much higher than ICBMs fly being an obvious exception).
The missile in it's current block, 1A, is really only
designed for SRBM interception, but it is still physically possible to intercept much larger, longer-ranged missiles with it as indicated by the satellite test. Iran, according to the article, has enough material for 2 weapons. The ships mentioned above have 90 or 122 VLS cells, so even if only one ship can engage and has only half its cells filled with SM-3s, it can simply fling SAMs at any 1 or 2 incoming Iranian missiles and get a kill through volume.
More importantly, the block 1B missile will be available this year, and is designed for MRBM and IRBM targets, and the Block IIA which gets into the ICBM range targets as a design goal will be availalbe by 2015. Keep in mind that while Iran can build an ICBM it hasn't, as far as we know actually made a nuclear device yet, nor miniaturized it to fit on an ICBM, nor solved the myriad problems of making everything function correctly as a complete system under the stresses of boost and re-entry so that the fast-moving reentry vehicle will detonate at the correct altitude. It may easily take them as long as until 2015 to make it work reliably.
In regard to defending Europe from missile attack:
1) Europe needs to take some responsibility itself here. They can build their own ABMs or purchase them from us
2) The Royal Netherlands Navy will be using SM-3 and can help out there too
In regards to the EMP attack by terrorists with a barge:
1) How the terrorists would get this barge of the coast of the U.S. unnoticed, erect this missile, and fire it without generating any suspicion is mysteriously left unmentioned.
2) Where the missile and warhead would come from is also left unmentioned; presumably from some place that already can make such things work reliably
3) The altitude, and ground location of the setonation as well as the yield of the weapon is left unmentioned; whiel yield is less important in EMP attaks than direct attacks, it is still significant. A 10 kiloton weapon will only generate 8% of the EMP of a 1-megaton weapon, and getting larger yields generally requires thermonuclear designs which are A) more advanced technology and B) are actually less efficient at EMP generation because the first stage can pre-ionize the air.
4) I find the idea that the U.S. would be reduced to pre-industrial technology and that 9 of 10 people would die to be a gross exaggeration. While a large device detonated over, say, Kansas could effect the entire CONUS, that would A) require a large device B) would require getting the weapon to considerable altitude; higher than the ISS or most low-orbit satellites and C) does not account for the effects of obstructions such as mountains, concrete buildings, etc. EMP is a line-of-sight effect and while it does have the ability to penetrate earth or structures, that's got its limitations as well. Finally, anything not actually turned on would not be affected, nor would many analogue systems. Repairs are also really not hard to make if spare parts are on hand, although there is no concerted civil defense effort in that regard here in the U.S.
5) Such a short-range weapon is well within the engagement parameters of a Sm-3 launched from an Aegis ship in either Norfolk or San Diego assuming they can get close enough to fire it unnoticed in the first place.
In short, the man brings up valid concerns, but he really misses one major point: Mutual Assured Destruction isn't something we need to worry about not working with Iran. It's just assured destruction - theirs. Sure, they might be able to EMP us and make things suck, but the country would be physically intact; even if they got their other missile through we'd have lost one city. They, however, would lose
everything. One SSBN has more than enough missiles and warheads to destroy their major military installations and industrial centers.
Iran knows that.