Khross wrote:
Hopwin wrote:
As for praxeology, it is misleading to call it a study of anything since it is not a science, it is an anti-science. They reject empirical data and go with what is "logical", a sort of proto-freakonomics. Saying it is a study of human actions and behaviors is the same as calling my day-dreaming about daisies a study.
Ummm, no? Where do you get this stuff? Seriously, that's at least as bad as RangerDave's original post.
Quote:
Empiricism, beginning with Hume's skepticism and including all of its positivist variants, shares the historicist's denial of necessity. It attempts to salvage the categories of "law" and "theory" by invoking the procedure of induction, i.e., the derivation of theory from the generalization of observed conjunctions of historical events. However, empiricism has yet to solve the "problem of induction." It cannot, on the basis of its own epistemological tenets, offer a satisfactory basis for the assumption that its generalizations apply with equal force to future events. Thus empiricism does not provide a true alternative to historicism. It leaves intact the claim, disputed by Menger and by Mises, that scientific knowledge consists entirely of generalizations "drawn from past experience that could always be upset by some later experience."
In countering positivism, Mises took refuge in Kantian epistemology and especially in Kant's defense of the category of the synthetic a priori. What Mises regarded as crucial in Kant was, however, not Kant's formal analysis of a priori knowledge or his epistemological idealism, but rather his conviction, contra empiricism and historicism, that reason could give universal and necessary knowledge—knowledge that was fresh and informative.
In the sense in which he applied it in economics, Mises' apriorism did not differ fundamentally from Menger's Aristotelian essentialism.
Praxeology represents an attempt to escape the nihilistic implications of both historicism and empiricism. It affirms the operation of inviolable laws within the realm of human action. It purports to establish the universal validity
of these laws by deducing them from the allegedly incontestable truth that people act purposefully, the "axiom of action." Although supposedly irrefutable, this axiom is not merely "analytic," i.e., nonempirical or vacuous.
It is based upon the reality of the pursuit of ends and the choice of means for their attainment that distinguishes all mental (and, hence, human) activity. Thus a priori to Mises means "independent of any particular time or place."
It does not imply independence from all "experience," although it does denote independence from the sort of sensory experience that empiricism and positivism emphasize: "It rests on universal inner experience, and not simply on
external experience, i.e., its evidence is reflective rather than physical."
22 • The Review of Austrian Economics
Sense data alone, on the other hand, could not reveal to us the essential purposefulness
of human actions.
Nor is experience of the empiricist variety effective in refuting theories derived praxeologically. Rather, refutation of a praxeological theory requires discovery of a fault in the chain of reasoning employed by the praxeologist. Empirical evidence does not "falsify" a theory, but rather serves to establish the appropriateness of the theory's application to a particular, concrete event. To meaningfully deny the "action axiom" (i.e., the claim that people act purposefully) is difficult. Denial of the axiom's empirical validity involves a purposeful act on the part of skeptics. It therefore confronts them with the uncomfortable choice of either conceding the issue or proclaiming that their own disagreement is purposeless. Thus, any denial of the action axiom is selfcontradictory.
Yet it is neither "empty" nor "arbitrary": it is axiomatic in the sense that distinguishes an axiom from a postulate. It is epistemologically distinct from the a priori assumptions employed in the hypothetical-deductive procedures of orthodox (neoclassical) economics. To be sure, Mises would have insisted that all of the lasting discoveries of the classical and neoclassical economists in the realm of pure theory were in fact results of the method described by praxeology; but this was by no means the acknowledged procedure of those schools of thought. Neoclassical economics regards even its most fundamental "laws" as contingent or "probable." Indeed, many of its modern theorems are based upon patently
false assumptions, some selected for their alleged predictive capacity and all subject to empirical testing and falsification. The fundamental "laws" of praxeology are, in contrast, held by it to be universally valid. They hold with
"apodictic certainty."
Mises was heavily influenced by Max Weber as well as by Kant. It was from Weber that Mises took the notion of purposefulness which he made the starting point of praxeological analysis. Mises also adopted Weber's emphasis
upon methodological individualism and his insistence upon the necessity and possibility of an entirely value-free (wertfrei) science of human action. Using these notions, Mises refined Menger's development of the subjective theory
of value.
Mises' extended application of praxeological subjectivism may be viewed as a limited version of the doctrine of epistemological subjectivism or idealism:
it maintains that within the realm of human action, there are phenomena—
in particular, market phenomena—that exist only by virtue of the consciousness
of purposeful individuals. Thus, value, wealth, profit, loss, and
cost are products of human thought, having no "objective" or extensive foundation.
One cannot imagine their existence or conceive their alteration, except
in connection with acts of valuation and choice.19 (I shall have occasion
to insist upon the consistent application of this subjective doctrine later on
Praxeology and Understanding • 23
in this article.) Thus, to explain market phenomena in a manner consistent with its subjectivism, praxeology refers to acts of valuation and choice. However, praxeological subjectivism is also value-free or nonnormative:
[It] does not pass judgment on action, but takes it exactly as it is, and it
explains market phenomena not on the basis of "right" action, but on the
basis of given action. It does not seek to explain the exchange ratios that
would exist on the assumption that men are governed exclusively by certain
motives and that other motives which do in fact govern them, have no effect.
It wants to comprehend the formation of exchange ratios that actually appear
in the market.
Praxeology is also distinct from psychology. Although it explains market phenomena in terms of individual purposefulness, it does not seek to identify the motivations, thoughts, and ends that give rise to particular purposes and choices. The inability of the praxeologists, as "pure theorists," to identify the ends of acting individuals also prevents them from constructing categories oi "economic" and "noneconomic" action. Moreover, it prohibits them from
passing judgment on the appropriateness of individual choices. Because praxeology does not judge actions, it is also not in a position to regard any act as "irrational." It recognizes that all acts of choice have meaning to the individual
choosers in terms of some goal or purpose, however peculiar or ephemeral, that directs their actions: "The idea of an action not in conformity with needs is absurd. As soon as one attempts to distinguish between the need and the action and makes the need the criterion for judging the action, one leaves the domain of theoretical science, with its neutrality in regard to value judgments."
This application of subjectivism freed praxeology from psychological or normative assumptions and made it the analysis of the "pure logic of choice." Through it economics could become a means for the discovery of universal truths. Subjectivism was not wanted for its own sake, but as a means toward the Austrian quest for elements of necessity within the sequence of social events.
In summation, stuff happens because people are motivated by stuff and we don't really know what it is. What happened yesterday or today has no impact on tomorrow. It is a rejection of macroeconomics as a whole and embrace of super-microeconomics.
_________________
Quote:
In comic strips the person on the left always speaks first. - George Carlin