The Glade 4.0

By Michael Yon

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

The Greatest Afghanistan War has deteriorated so noticeably that one can now feel the enemy's growing pulse. Each month it beats steadier, stronger, and in 2010 it will finally be born.

On Sept. 11 in Kandahar, a South African civilian working without security was visibly upset - not at the Taliban but at the police. The 16-year police veteran recounted seeing Afghan police speeding through crowded streets and hitting a bicycle. The rider gymnastically avoided impact while the bicycle was tossed down the road.

The South African, with whom I spent a week in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, said the police never slowed down. "That's part of the reason the Taliban are gaining ground," he said. "The police are out there recruiting Taliban."

I have searched for answers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Along with the more strategic questions (for example, should war be pursued?) are those closer to the shop floor: Are we gaining or losing popular support? Is the enemy gaining or losing strength? Is the coalition gaining or losing strength?

The first answer is a common denominator for the rest.

We are losing popular support. Confidence in the Afghan and coalition governments is plummeting. Loss of human terrain is evident. Conditions are building for an avalanche. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the military commander in Afghanistan, and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates are aware of the rumbling, and so today we are bound by rules of engagement that appear insensible.

We must curb civilian losses at expense to ourselves. I believe the reasoning is sound and will share those increased dangers. Erosion of popular support seems reversible. There still is considerable good will from the Afghan population, but bomb by bomb we can blow it. We have breathing room if we work with wise alacrity. I sense a favorable shift in our operations occurring under Gen. McChrystal.

Enemies are strengthening. Attacks are dramatically increasing in frequency and efficacy. We are being out-governed by tribes and historical social structures. These structures are - and will be for the foreseeable future - the most powerful influence upon and within the political terrain. "Democracy" does not grow on land where most people don't vote. The most remarkable item I saw during the Aug. 20 elections was the machine-gun ambush we walked into.

The coalition is weakening. While the U.S. has gotten serious, the organism called NATO is a jellyfish for which the United States is both sea and prevailing wind. The disappointing effort from many partners is best exemplified by the partners who are pushing hardest: The British are fine examples.

The British landed in Helmand province after someone apparently vouched that Helmand would be safe, and they believed it. Helmand is today the most dangerous province in Afghanistan.

British combat tours are arduous and the troops suffer in countless ways. The soldiers sweat and freeze in the desert filth; British rations are terrible; mail can be weeks late; and they fight constantly. Troops endure high casualties yet they keep fighting. These things are true. Some say the British "lost Helmand," but this is not true. Helmand was a mess before they arrived. British soldiers are strong but their government is pitiful, leading to an average effort in Afghanistan.

Example: The British serve six-month tours, minus two weeks' leave. Travel is not deducted from leave. Troops are so few at Forward Operating Base Inkerman that missions are planned around leave schedules. For leave, a soldier at Inkerman must helicopter to Camp Bastion (the main British military base in Afghanistan) to jet home.

Helicopters are scarce, making flight schedules erratic. As leave approaches, soldiers stop doing missions and wait for a helicopter. The waiting can last a week or more. Then they get home, take two weeks' leave, then transport back to Bastion, where the soldier waits to helicopter back to Inkerman.

When I departed Bastion last month, some soldiers waited three weeks to helicopter back to Inkerman, and were still waiting. That's six to seven lost weeks for a soldier on a six-month tour. After other distractions, British soldiers might net three months of focused work. There is zero time to conduct counterinsurgency, and besides, the British military, despite its war-fighting ability, is not good at counterinsurgency. Without change, London likely will be defeated in Helmand within roughly two years, which brings us to the fall of 2011.

Germans had deployed to one of the safest areas in Afghanistan yet today they are staggered by Taliban punches. Berlin is brittle and apt to quit. Smart money says the Germans crumble from any significant role by 2011.

Canadians will quit in 2011. Canadian soldiers have earned respect, but their NATO-partner government has empowered our enemies by quitting at a crucial moment. This likely will be remembered consciously and subconsciously in future dealings with Ottawa.

Other fine partners, such as the Dutch, who have fought well, plan to downsize right when we need them most. The Dutch need to stay in this fight and increase their efforts. We need them.

The key partner in redirecting Afghanistan should be the Afghan government. Yet Afghan President Hamid Karzai's corrupt narcocracy is widely disrespected by Afghans and increasingly combative with the coalition. We are pouring support into a government that we don't want, and many Afghans resent.

On Aug. 26, I was in Helmand with the British when a bomb exploded in Kandahar, killing at least 41 people and blowing out windows in the room I later rented to write this account. There were bombs and attacks on a daily basis in Kandahar but I only watch from the roof as Afghans kill Afghans. Potential for civil war is great.

In this unprecedented moment, dozens of the world's most notable nations have focused on helping one land, yet Western sympathies for Afghanistan already have peaked.

While an Afghan avalanche is poised, our thoughts are growing cold. This is it. Either we will begin to show progress by the end of 2010 or, piece by piece, the coalition will cleave off and drift away, meaning 2011 will begin the end to significant involvement in Afghanistan.

Michael Yon is a writer and former Green Beret who has spent more time in Iraq and Afghanistan with U.S. and British combat forces than any other journalist.

I like how Obama blamed Bush for not giving Afghanistan the resources it needs, and now he's looking into pulling more resources out.

But he's on the record as critical of Bush's handling of it, so any failure there will continue to be Bush's, in his supporters' eyes.

I can't imagine any supporter of Obama to actually be so naive to think he isn't responsible for his own policies and actions. To attempt to push the blame to someone out of office for 9+ months would be counter to the intellectual thought process that brought them to support Obama in the first place.

The US has been in trouble in Afghanistan for many years. Basically, since we shifted focus to Iraq.

From the Washington Times...

Sarchasm (n): The gulf between the author of sarcastic wit and the person who doesn't get it.

Fun Fact:
The Internet is totally incapable of conveying tone.

Incorrect. Text, is incapable of conveying tone.

I think it can be said that Obama now owns every issue and problem this country faces. He's played out the "inherited from bush" card to it's max.

Afghanistan is going to be a wedge issue for Obama supporters. If he sends more troops to make his "war of necessity" work, he alienates the peaceniks. If he pulls a Kerry waffle on the issue, he fails another campagin promise, and alienates the moderates.

I feel Obama was, and still is, unprepared to be the President. It's a long stretch from making campagin promises and having to live up to them. With the internet, we have every promise he made, in the context and tone he made it in. Really there is no way for him to back out of it, and relying on the sports team mentality to carry him through the next election isn't looking too good.

That's pretty convienient. Yes, the way forward is definitely in his lap now, but the past is in *no* way his fault, and cannot be forgotten as things play out. We are far too fond of glossing over our past and not holding people responsible for it.

I will never understand why any person on the planet thinks they can succeed where Alexander the Great could not. The political costs are dire no matter what we chose, and while I'd like to think that wouldn't matter, I know that it will. Obama is in a very, very tight spot on Afghanistan, and as DE pointed out, a lot of that has now shifted to Pakistan as well.

The problem is at this point, there is no good answer. The failures of the last 8 years have left us in a terribly untenable position. We failed the Afghan people, and that blame lies at Bush's feet first and foremost. His failure to do that job *right*, from the get go, has led us to where we stand now.

That being said, the way forward is up to the President. What do we want? He has stated that his goal is to deal with AQ. ok, let's do that. I'm all for that. However, that means dealing with two foes - the resurgent Taliban and AQ. If you let one go, they will foster the other. I don't really see a way to turn them against each other, either.

No one has ever been fully prepared to be President. No one. Not Washington, not Lincoln, and not Obama. That being said, I think he has a *much* keener intellect than his predecessor, a better grasp on international relations and diplomacy, and a much more intellectually engaged administration.

Incorrect. Text, is incapable of conveying tone.

Oh, Reeeeaaaaallly?